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This paper seeks to investigate France’s ongoing role in its former colonies. By assessing the 
practical application of Dependency Theory and Modernist Theory to two unique African states, 
Côte D’Ivoire and Gabon, I seek to provide a comprehensive analysis of the relative costs and 
benefits of French political and economic influence in these countries. An in-depth discussion of 
either case’s history and political ties with France will allow us to lay the groundwork for an 
investigation of French trade and foreign direct investment into both economies. To evaluate the 
costs and benefits I will consult key development indicators and democracy indices. This work 
finds that the political and economic ties that bind France to her former colonies can, as 
Dependency Theorists claim, undermine democracy and good-governance. However, we are also 
able to conclude that both cases have benefited from French multinational presence in their 
economies though there are limitations to the full modernist interpretation. Lastly this paper was 
unable to assert whether or not French multi-national presence has a significant effect on either 
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                The age of empire permanently altered the course of history for the world. This work 
seeks to investigate whether modern African still remains in some way under “neo-colonial” 
control or whether long-standing commercial and political ties have had net benefits.  Nearly all 
of Africa, Asia and the Americas were at one time or another, subjects of a European power. 
Motivated by mercantile ambition, religious proselytization or simply military prestige, 
Europeans planted their flags on every corner of the globe. The scramble for Africa was a 
remarkably peaceful time in Europe. A period sometimes referred to as the first era of 
globalization, the late 1800s saw remarkable amounts of international exchange (Tena-Junguito 
2016). Instead of vying for dominance in Europe, global spheres of influence began to take 
shape. Once the world had been doled out to these powers, friction between them led to a war, 
one that would restructure the global order in 1918. Following that transformative conflict, what 
empires there were left, primarily Britain and France, though Portugal, Italy the Netherlands and 
the US had small empires, insulated themselves from the rest. Britain became reliant on its vast 
empire to sustain its manufacturing industry through the commonwealth (Rooth, 2010). France 
did the same with their African and Asian holdings creating the Franc Bloc. When France fell to 
the Germans in 1940, their colonial empire became the most important asset for the long-run 
survival of the Republic.  
In 1941, the 3rd point of the Atlantic Charter, signed by Churchill and Roosevelt, 







imperial parties began to sprout and become more vocal in Africa, most adopting a leftist 
political ideology.  De Gaulle made his intention clear that France’s African holdings would 
forever be a part of France, with the Brazzaville declaration of 1944 (De-Gaulle 1944). By the 
end of the Second World War however, amid a rapidly evolving bipolar global order Britain and 
France decided that direct administration of overseas territories was not sustainable; the 
colonized world was moving toward a mosaic of independent states. The question to what extent 
those countries are truly sovereign in terms of economic and diplomatic policy is a central query 
I aim to address.  
 The French colonial model is central to this discussion. The French, unlike their British 
counterparts ruled their colonial empire through a policy of assimilation. French was the only 
language that could be formally learned in colonially administered schools (Kamara 2005). 
French laws and customs slowly reached every corner of their African domains. The French 
preferred Frenchmen to local leaders to administer colonial territories unlike the British. This 
system, while successful in some regions, required significant budgetary resources To alleviate 
the financial burden of this type of administration, Africans whom the French deemed 
assimilated enough, had the freedom to migrate to France to further their education and seek 
political office back in their home colony. Most African anti-imperialists/independence 
advocates from the French domains, even those educated in France and within the political 
mainstream—members of the colonial administration or national assembly—had had long 
careers in Marxist political ideology (Coats 1994). Unlike the United States, socialist parities had 
been operating in French civil society since the collapse of the Second French Empire. The vast 







independence, opting instead to embrace Paris. This new class of ‘Francophile’ Africans would 
become the future leaders of independent African countries.  
 The decolonization process of French African colonies was uniquely peaceful when 
compared to the experience of the Portuguese and British with the exception of Algeria. Only 
Guinea completely severed ties with Paris, when in 1958 Seku Torré rejected the French 
decolonization plan and unilaterally declared independence two years before the rest (Pace 
1984). The French were careful to remain friendly with the new leaders, partially because of the 
looming threat of communism and partially because the economic role the colonies had had in 
what was the French Empire. The policy of FrançeAfrique was born in the 1960s. Jaques 
Foccart, a French diplomat who became a de facto Minister of Africa in the Élysée palace under 
Charles De Gaulle. The man was renowned for developing the ‘Foccart Networks,’ a collection 
of life-long relationships between African leaders, French politicians, and businessmen. For 
decades it was believed that Gabon served as the hub of the Foccart networks, with Leon M’ba 
and Omar Bongo playing a pivotal role in representing French interests in neighboring countries 
(“The French Connection” 2014). Most commentators believed that these networks were 
strongest in the decades following independence and have since become less influential. Jaques 
Foccart set the stage for this investigation. This foreign policy secured newly independent 
countries firmly within the French sphere of influence.
By the mid-60s, nearly every single colonial holding in Africa or Asia had achieved 
independence. The degree to which these newly independent states are truly so is highly 
dependent on how one regards the presence of multinational corporations, military assets, trade 
balances and political authority and autonomy. This work seeks to define the relationship 







between France and her former African domains.  Has prolonged French presence in these 
countries led to economic growth, development, and strengthening of democratic institutions and 
governance? Or, has what hero of Ghanaian independence, Kwame Nkrumah calls ‘neo-
Imperialism’ undermined democracy and innovation in African countries? Two competing 
economic development theories, Modernist Theory and Dependency Theory will be weighed for 
whether either applies to two former French colonies, Côte D’Ivoire and Gabon and their 


















II. Literature Review 
 
Contemporary academia pertaining to economic and political relations between African 
states and their previous colonial patrons can be loosely grouped into two bodies. First, one that 
stems from traditional Marxism but is now known as Neo-Marxism and Dependency Theory and 
second, liberalism or Neo-Liberalism as it relates to economic interaction and economic growth 
in developing nations. Both observe these interactions in vastly different ways. Marxism 
underscores the negative exploitive practices of large capitalist countries and corporations in 
developing countries. Liberalism, on the other hand, approaches the issue with an emphasis on 
the economic benefits of multi-national financial and global trade interactions. Once we have 
established the theoretical framework for this economic interaction, we may examine 
contemporary scholarship that tests the efficacy of the theories in practical terms. Attention will 
be drawn toward empirical studies that weigh the relative benefits and costs of multinational 
corporations operating in developing economies. A brief look at scholarship pertaining 
specifically to political influence between former colonies and their European powers will help 
better uncover the diplomatic implications of personal ties between elite in both countries. 
i. Marxism, Neo-Marxism and Dependency Theory and Empirical Evidence 
 
In Karl Marx’s Communist Manifesto the political philosopher frames economic 
exploitation of the proletariat with particular attention paid toward the division of labor and 
factors of production. Though Marx famously never explicitly addressed imperialism by name, 






the most well-known self-proclaimed Marxist who did was Lenin, who in 1917 published his 
book Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, In it he decried that capitalists in Europe had 
‘enslaved’ the masses of Africans and Asians for the sake of profit and economic growth in their 
home countries by way of establishing absolute monopolies and monopsonies. He effectively 
laid the foundation for Neo-Marxist schools of thought and made the opposition and criticism of 
imperialism a central premise of further scholars. Unlike conventional Marxism, Neo-Marxist 
academics emphasized resource plundering of colonies, social imperialism and, rather than a 
primarily labor based analysis. Self-proclaimed neo-Marxist Walter Rodney illustrates this 
perspective, “Many parts of the world that are naturally rich are actually poor and parts that are 
not so well off in wealth of soil and sun-soil are enjoying the highest standards of living” 
(Rodney 21, 1981). It was this premise that motivated the Marxist and Neo-Marxist approach. 
Following the end of the Second World War, as colonial empires began to dissolve, 
traditional Marxist and Neo-Marxist thought developed into what is today Dependency Theory. 
The Singer-Prebisch Hypothesis established the central premise of Dependency Theory, 
asserting that over time, poor, resource rich regions in the developing world see their economies 
become more and more dependent on manufactured goods from the west and particularly, those 
country’s former colonizers (Toye, Toye, 2003). Singer believed that capital investment from 
rich countries would only flow into primary resource production in poor countries, hindering the 
prospects for developing domestic manufacturing. The implication is that when economies rely 
on primary resources to spark growth, they become price takers from large rich countries, which 
puts downward pressure on wages in poor economies. Ultimately, poor countries become 
dependent on foreign goods and capital. The economists, Singer and Prebisch championed 






protectionism in trade policy and Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI)—a policy that 
promoted domestic production of goods rather than a reliance on foreign imports—for the 
developing world (Bloch & Sapsford 1998).  
Another prominent dependency theorist, Baran provided additional foundation for the 
concept’s further development. Baran adopted Lenin’s conclusions related to monopoly and 
monopsony, using it to support his claim that western dominance of developing economies will 
continue unhampered because of the surplus of manufactured goods from the west and the 
change in consumer taste in former colonies. He also hypothesized that despite excess capital 
accumulation in the west, it would be forever unlikely that capital surplus would be invested in 
the developing world and the prospect of domestically generated capital was unlikely and that 
capital which was generated domestically would be invested in primary resource production due 
to infant industries in developing countries lack competitiveness. This accumulation of capital in 
rich countries would continue to grow leaving capital formation in the developing world reliant 
on initial capital from large rich economies (Baran 1957).  
Nkrumah presents the number of ways that relations between the west and newly 
independent African states are exploitive in nature. As the first president of a former African 
colony (Ghana), Nkrumah frames modern imperialism within the post-WWII global order, where 
U.S. dominated international organizations and institutions have become the primary method to 
limit African development and sovereignty. Nkrumah is critical of the Breton Woods system 
believing that structural adjustment programs, sponsored by the International Monetary Fund 
have led to the most exploitive practices of western multinational organizations, through often 
abrupt and poorly thought through economic liberalization. He claims independent African states 






will struggle for true independence unless Socialist revolution permanently severs exploitive ties 
designed to keep them reliant on the west (Nkrumah 1966). He concludes his work by asserting 
that colonialism is still alive in Africa, even after independence but ultimately appeals to 
Socialism as the best mode to combat expletive European powers. He, like Singer and Prebisch, 
supports ISI and protectionism but notes some of its limitations. 
Another notable proponent of Dependency Theory was Frank who discussed how much 
of the developing world, particularly in South and Central America had strong, effective 
agricultural and pastoral traditions prior to European arrival. The ‘feudal’ system introduced by 
the Spanish and Portuguese, he asserts, is the primary reason for food insecurity on the continent 
and countries’ long-term dependence on food imports from elsewhere. Frank notes similarities in 
Africa and Asia, charging European colonial powers of intentionally building a system of 
dependence (Frank 1966).  
Neo-Marxist Dependency Theory has been championed by many in the development 
field, but the implications and proposed policies have had mixed results on developing 
economies, notably ISI and trade barriers. Liberals and Neo-Liberals, though they may accept 
some of the observations of Neo-Marxist economists, provide criticism of policy prescriptions 
proposed by them. Now that we have discussed what Dependency Theory is, a brief discussion 
of empirical evidence in support of the theory is necessary before assessing the Theory in either 
of our cases. 
Krapohl and Fink saw asymmetric economic benefits of North-South trade agreements in 
the North’s favor. While this does not come as a surprise if you ascribe to Marxist thought, they 






found that the west has backed out of trade negotiations more than developing nations have. He 
wagers that the west is able to offer up more during the negotiation period in terms of market 
access in their economies, however, he notes that developing economies seldom have goods that 
can be sold in western consumer markets. Krapohl and Fink believe that the relative size of 
western economies coupled with the relatively large number of individual developing nations 
gives the west significantly more negotiating power (Krapohl & Fink 2009). They pose the 
common “race to the bottom” idea where developing states, desperate for international trade 
must accept poor trade terms. 
 Lanagan investigates multilateral aid to Africa from the EU. Officially, this aid is given 
without any prerequisites; however, Lanagan found that when looking at Uganda, Ghana and 
Tanzania, this aid had several effects. The primary and most applicable effect that this aid had 
was to expand market access for European firms. Lanagan provided empirical evidence that aid-
for-trade relationships exist and primarily serve to enrich the upper crust of a developing 
economy and limit domestic entrepreneurship (Lanagan 2014).  
Mclean studied multilateral aid from the OECD to African states and increased market 
access. McLean’s data also includes statistics on market access for African firms in European 
economies. He found that not only did trade liberalization produce an influx of aid from the 
OECD; but also that African firm's share in European markets did not increase by any 
measurable degree after liberalization.  McLean finds that the return on foreign direct investment 
is less if not accompanied by aid and subsequent liberalization and further, that most trade 
liberalization was not accompanied by any noticeable change in governance and that it generally 
contributed to increased income inequality (Mclean 2014).    






Harvey observed economic relations between Africa and the rest of the world and was 
able to divide relations into three distinct periods of post-colonial imperialism. The first period is 
one in which the infrastructure developed by the colonizers was further used to exploit existing 
natural resources. Harvey differs in that he believed that the west continued this practice just 
after independence. The second phase of neo-imperialism came in the form of large 
multinational organizations tightening their grip on specific economies as opposed to more direct 
government influence. He noted that multinational firms were able to capitalize on already strong 
relationships between the west and African countries despite domestic barriers. The last phase, 
he suggests, is that of non-western states’ interests in investing into African economies (Hervey 
2003). He investigates increased Chinese presence in developing countries’ economies and notes 
a similar story. His analysis is vital for the understanding of neo-colonialism in a more 
contemporary context generally adding evidence in support of Dependency Theory.   
Kemp investigated the origins of colonialism through a Marxist paradigm. He analyzed 
initial motives for colonialism and found that the overwhelming catalyst for the establishment of 
colonies was, as Harvey postulated, resource “plundering” (Harvey 2003). He suggests that 
many states were willing to grant independence to their African colonies because the avenues for 
the west to continue to benefit from these natural resources cheaply would remain intact. Trade 
could be secured without the administrative burden of managing these territories (Kemp, 1967). 
These conclusions, while they mirror that of other political scientists are important to consider, 
as he purposefully downplays political motivations for imperialism. 
To add to Kemp’s discussion of the Marxist view of colonialism, Warren asserts many of 
the same critiques of capitalism as does Lenin (1917). He argues that imperialism is the 






penultimate phase of capitalism. He suggests that colonization is motivated by capitalism but 
effectively limits its existence in developing states. He draws links between forced resource 
extractions by colonizers to large multinational organizations in the 20th century. His central 
claim is that imperialism gave control of African economies to foreign companies who subvert 
homegrown entrepreneurialism by diverting capital away from uncompetitive infant industries 
(Warren 1984). While most states allow for private ownership of land and capital, the vestiges of 
colonial rule remain in the form of foreign companies receiving favorable business 
environments. 
Hargrave investigates the weaknesses of newly independent West African economies and 
the factors that lead to poor growth. He suggests that many African states had the infrastructure 
for development but lacked the physical capital to use it. He argues that these countries were 
often desperate for Western investment and often gave foreign countries considerable control of 
their economies so that their natural resources could be extracted. Beyond that, he argues that the 
French specifically did not develop a strong system for tax collection in their colonies and 
administration by locals, requiring new countries to develop complex administrative systems 
from scratch (Hargrave 1969). Many West African colonies were losing money for the French 
government so it was unsurprising that these countries would likely begin their independence in 
poor economic standing meaning that those newly independent African countries required 
substantial assistance from France in the form of military protection and economic investment. 
 Kamarck poses the argument that African economies can only be productive if they have 
ample amounts of capital. He notes that this capital eventually flowed into these countries but 
was not given for free and certainly did not benefit the average African. Because returns on 






investment are notably smaller and risk considerably higher, capital generally shies away from 
African states ( Kamarck 1967). Kamarck provides some empirical support for Baran’s claims 
made a decade before on how capital is distributed in these economies.  
Giuliani and Macchi observed the impact of multinational corporations on human rights 
in recipient developing countries. The two concluded with a number of positive and negative 
impacts of private foreign corporations operations in developing nations, isolating technological, 
social, civil and financial factors. The political scientists, without claiming their findings applied 
to all developing states, concluded that a positive relation existed between multinational 
corporations domestic direct investment and social, state and civil economic and human rights 
capabilities. They found that institutions strengthened overtime as MNCs settled in putting them 
at odds with most neo-colonial political scientist. Despite this disagreement, the two also found 
that when host countries accepted MNCs, serious negative effects occurred in the level of 
domestic economic competitiveness of firms and were unable to find any positive technological 
spillover effects in advanced industries though some was found in those related to resource 
extraction and agriculture (Giuliani & Macchi 2013). Their work both fortifies traditional 
understanding of neo-colonial economic exploitation while refuting hypotheses that MNCs 
undermine host country's government institutions. They also investigated crowding effects of 
FDI in developing economies; specifically, direct "greenfield" investment. Discovering that FDI 
reduces domestically generated capital and limits its mobility through the domestic market.   
 






ii. Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism, Modernist Theory and Empirical Evidence 
 
There are few distinctions between liberalism and Neo-Liberalism in the context of neo-
imperialism or neo-colonialism. Because Neo-Liberalism relates specifically to the globally 
interconnected character of modern international exchange, this will be the primary theory 
discussed in opposition to Marxist thought. However, it should be made clear that neo-liberals do 
not necessarily deny the central premise of Dependency Theory, they do however believe that 
liberal economic policy is the best method for development, which inherently supports western 
involvement in former colonies. The extreme theory in-line with the neo-liberal school is 
Modernism, a theory which champions Western exceptionalism but is often discussed within a 
sociological perspective more often rather than one grounded in economics.  
Liberalism’s core premise is the efficient distribution of outputs and inputs such that 
there is a net welfare increase following economic exchange, thus the classical economists like 
Smith and Ricardo made clear that imperialism was inefficient and free trade between equal 
partners ought to be preferred. It was not until Europeans arrived in Asia when liberals and 
proponents of free trade began to use racial justification for empire thus, centuries of mercantile 
and imperial international economic systems followed.  
Hobson is perhaps the first liberal economist that addressed the idea of empire from an 
economic perspective. Hobson observes the large British Empire at its height just prior to the 
First World War. Hobson’s argument centers on the strong bargaining power of colonial 
administrators and their ability to lobby for economic and financial investment into their 






territories after monopoly of violence has been achieved. He suggests that productivity of a 
colonial territory is expanded tremendously with access to an international mercantile market, 
technology, law, god and military protection. He does not believe that capitalism is the primary 
motive for colonial expansion but it is instead driven by a desire for international prestige. He 
accounts for trade within and without the empire, asserting that mercantile exchange though 
unequal, is still mutually beneficial. He criticizes ‘Aggressive Imperialism’ which he believes to 
be misguided and too expensive for what it is worth to the economy.  Perhaps the most novel 
conclusion Hobson reaches is, by allowing for colonial subjects to have their incomes rise and 
local economies to grow, the strength of the commonwealth as a whole will dramatically 
increase but he simultaneously suggests that such a policy would undercut cohesiveness of the 
empire as a whole (Hobson 1902). In the long run, however, Hobson harbored a suspicion that 
Imperial competition might lead to war between great powers. Hobson is often regarded, as an 
anti-imperialist because of his vehement distaste for coercive tactics of eliciting labor from 
indigenous communities.   
Angell addresses imperialism in the world order just preceding the Second World War. 
Angell discuses the many moral criticisms of a colonial empire and notes the substantial rise in 
nationalism, particularly in India.  He suggests that independence peacefully or by conflict is 
inevitable so to be proactive, economic self-rule should be a priority with the ultimate goal of 
complete political independence. Though he hesitates to claim that being under the British 
Empire had positive welfare effects on subjects, he outlines an image of a system of international 
exchange made up of former subjects. He notes the possibility of colonies forming raw resource 
cartels, which could attract ample investment to those new economies and could serve British 






banking institutions, capital owners and insurance companies (Angell 1931). He subscribed to 
the view that free trade with partners who have full domestic control of factors of production 
would serve both exchanging parities best in the long-run, but still indicated that barriers should 
be erected between trade with countries outside of the group for long-run success. He, like 
Hobson, attributes the rise of empire to the yearning for prestige rather than a natural capitalist 
impulse.  
A more contemporary liberal perspective of economic interaction between the developed 
and developing world comes from Wolf, who is a staunch supporter of globalism. Wolf observes 
the rapid growth in developing economies within the Breton Woods order, emphasizing the role 
of international institutions like the WTO and United Nations and to a lesser extent IBRD and 
the IMF. While addressing the many criticisms of globalization such as corruption and collapse 
of domestic agriculture, Wolf believes that embrace of the global market is the only way to see 
growth. He rejects the notion that multinational corporations have a net cost to developing 
countries, suggesting that FDI and any other sort of capital inflows may only have a net positive 
affect in the long-run, referring to corporate exploitation and the race to the bottom argument as 
“myth.” He takes his argument a step further and asserts that labor in developing countries is 
“under-exploited,” in that, the masses of idol labor in the developing world just need capital to 
“get to work”. Wolf rejects the “resource curse” argument and like his labor argument, believes 
natural resources have been “under-exploited” in the developing world (Wolf 2004).  To tap 
those resources is the best way to provide domestic capital and increase the quality of life. 
Ultimately, to Wolf, intimate interaction with as few barriers as possible between the developed 
and developing world is the best method sustained economic growth. 






Modernist Theory, which adds a social/political angle to the argument is based on the 
ideology that the western model of society is the best method of social organization. Though not 
an explicit economic concept, Modernist Theory has been used to support liberal policy in non-
western economies.  Parsons and Halpern are among the most vocal proponents of the theory. 
The sociologists believe that democracy and civil liberty precede economic growth. He strongly 
supports the concept that the model for human interaction is embodied in the economic model of 
capitalist Europe and North America. Parsons and Halpern assert that only after building 
democratic institutions, protecting of civil rights and liberties and building civil society based on 
western values may capitalism work. The best method for growth allows complete influence of 
western culture into a developing country (Parsons & Halpurn 1967). This theory of 
development has few economists that support it with the orthodoxy of Parsons and Halpurn but 
one should not discount their observations or conclusions. It should be noted that though 
modernism in an economic context might not have broad recognition, the theory is used to 
develop education policy in many parts of the developing world. 
 Other prominent proponents of liberal development theory are economists like Jefferey 
Sachs and Paul Collier who argue for and embrace of international institutions and free trade just 
as Wolf does, but both emphasize different government policies for developing economies.  
Sachs defends a combination of market liberalization and ISI focusing on industries to which the 
country has a comparative advantage ( 2005). Collier, also believes that embrace of the 
international market is vital, specifically an open trade policy by the west toward the developing 
world. Collier recognizes the basic premises of Dependency Theory and especially what he calls 
the ‘export of values’, which unlike the Neo-Marxists, he believes, can be a positive phenomena. 






Collier’s thesis revolves around the importance of preferential trade policy by the west, a system 
that would allow the developing world to trade with the developed without barriers while still 
retaining some barriers to trade from the west. Collier endorses some forms of military 
intervention as well as an embrace of western law (2007).  Both development economists 
certainly would fall in the liberal category. Now that we set the stage for liberal and modernist 
theory, we will address several empirical investigations that support the theory. 
 D'Amelio, Garrone and Piscitello empirically investigated electricity access in sub-
Saharan Africa. Their investigation observed FDI, both in the form of portfolio investment and in 
the form of Greenfield investment. The economists, contrary to many of the assertions from 
previously discussed political scientists, found that countries without strongly established 
government institutions (similar to those found in western democracies) saw the quickest and 
most broad electrification. They explain this phenomenon by suggesting that when cumbersome 
government regulatory institutions begin establishing rules and guidelines, dissuades foreign 
investment (D'Amelio, Garrone & Piscitello, 2016).  Though the economists did not study to 
what degree environmental degradation occurred or what level of government corruption existed, 
they did suggest that these aspects of sub-Saharan countries would likely be made worse by lack 
of institutions and institutional oversight, ultimately agreeing on the same central premise that 
most scholars of neo-colonial exploitation do. Though their work refutes some claims made by 
modernists, it ultimately looks favorably toward MNC presence in countries, effectively 
supporting the modernist perspective. 
An empirical study by Nwaogu and Ryan observed how aid, remittances and FDI 
contributed to economic growth in the developing world. The two found that Africa was unique, 






in that, remittances and aid generally had no effect on the level of economic growth and, that 
FDI had the largest effect, however marginal. They explain Africa’s uniqueness among 
developing regions by suggesting that proximity to large markets and to other growing 
economies had the largest effect on whether or not a country had persistence positive economic 
growth (Nwaogu & Ryan 2015).  Africa, without nearby markets and infrastructure to support 
large exportable industries, other than raw resources, sees meager growth but would, had large 
markets been geographically closer or transportation costs were declining.  
Hinkle, Hope and Newfarmer empirically investigated Economic Partnership Agreements 
or EPAs. The political scientists analyzed the economic benefits of EPAs and how they 
contributed to complex relations between Europe, Africa, the Pacific and the Caribbean. They 
found that these trade arrangements gave newly independent states increased negotiating power 
with European countries on terms of trade. These EPA arrangements are trade relationships in 
which a group of nations in Africa, the Pacific and Caribbean have beneficial terms of trade with 
the European Union often in the form of favorable tariff deductions to the European market. 
Large groups of developing nations collectively have more leverage than they do if they 
negotiated bilaterally with a European country. The authors suggest that these arrangements led 
to the rise of “aid-for-trade” relationships. European countries are able to bypass these 
agreements and develop direct trade negotiations with specific governments, ultimately resulting 
in exploitive trade policies (Hinkle, Hope, & Newfarmer 2003). These political scientists posed a 
strong argument against both Dependency Theory and neo-Marxism, however their investigation 
was limited to complex trade agreements and with their conclusions related to aid-for-trade, they 
do suggest that neo-colonial exploitation persists through this method. 






Carchedi moves that developing states benefit from many trade arrangements. He looks 
at trade competition between the U.S. and Europe in Africa. He finds that often, African 
countries, endowed with natural resources take advantage of American and European business 
interests to gain better terms of trade. He argues that this trade competition between the U.S. and 
Europe has, overtime, been overcome by establishing the Commonwealth and Francophone 
community essentially divvying up African countries between western powers (Carchedi 2009). 
While this has not stopped trade competition, it has allowed Europe and the United States to still 
reap the benefits of exceptional terms of trade with African countries while simultaneously 
improving the welfare of locals. Modernist and Dependency theory in many cases observe the 
same effects. They differ in what they emphasize and the proper policy prescription to spark 
growth.  
iii. Pros and Cons of Multinational Corporations 
 
After addressing empirical evidence both in support of, and contrary to Marxism and 
Liberalism, it is worth briefly discussing the presence of multinational corporations and their 
interactions with developing economies and the relative benefits and costs.  
As suggested by a number of the previous authors discussed, multinational corporations 
have acted as the primary neo-colonial actor since the end of the cold war. This aspect of 
international economic interaction has been well researched but unlike the scholarship that 
addresses political neo-colonial interaction. Karnen and Paul outline to two primary methods of 
observing MNCs in relation to developing countries, the “Economic Development Model” and 






the “North-South Model” (Karnen & Paul 1985). Their work emphasizes that differences 
between methods are a result of what is emphasized rather than what is observed, where 
Economic Development Model, championed by liberal western economists focus on positive 
growth effects to economies and the North-South Model which emphasizes the negative impacts, 
generally toward social and government institutions. They purpose that a healthy use of both is 
the best method to assess the impacts of FDI. Both methods find that FDI is generally has a 
positive net welfare effect to a developing economy.  
Weinstein empirically investigated the effects of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) in 
the years following market liberalization in developing economies. He argues that developing 
nations are, and will always be, at a strategic disadvantage when negotiating for industrial 
investment in their economies. He suggests several reasons, emphasizing developing country’s 
level of need, suggesting their willingness to provide more concessions in the form of market 
liberalization. He notes that from this point, market liberalization serves to crowd out 
domestically owned industry and making the possibility for future development unlikely, a 
conclusion echoed by many dependency theorists (Weinstein,1978).  
Brown investigated MNCs presence in developing economies and their effect on 
domestic wages. His empirical test had several useful findings. First, that labor force 
participation in a developing economy did not rise after the presence of an MNC. Second, in 
conflict with previous authors discussed, Brown found a positive correlation between a civil-
liberties index and the presence of MNC in the economy even given that these countries tend to 
have higher wages. Brown's third important finding was that MNC presence had a negative 
correlation with the degree to which a country represses collective bargaining and free 






association (Brown, Deardorff & Stern, 2004). Brown's findings while they do not refute all 
claims made by critics of MNCs, do provide empirical evidence to refute the claim that MNCs 
are attracted to oppressive regimes. 
Narula and Dunning, in their own empirical study, sought to identify the changes in the 
bargaining power of developing governments and MNCs operating in their country. Narula and 
Dunning found that as economic development policies have become more focused on attracting 
FDI, bargaining power has shifted into the hands of MNCs, particularly those extremely large 
firms from western economies (Narula & Dunning 2000). The authors did note a steady increase 
in competition overtime, but despite this trend, MNCs wield disproportionate bargaining power.  
While there is little consensus on the benefits of MNCs or the merits of Dependency 
Theory or Modernist Theory, from here I may contribute a case study of two former colonies, 
Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon, and how foreign investment has strengthened (Modernist) or weakened 
(Dependency) economic growth and governance in both countries. Having a comprehensive 
understanding of specific industries, trade and history for each case and France will provide the 
evidence, both qualitative and quantitative, for either theory being closer to what the true nature 
of the relationship is.  
iv. Political Influence In Former Colonies 
 
Franco-Ivorian and Franco-Gabonese relations go beyond the realm of economics. 
Political imperialism is a real occurrence in the geopolitical interaction between the developed 
and developing world. The west is able to wield their influence to coerce developing countries to 






mirror their political stance to that of the developed country. There has been research into this 
field and views and conclusions differ depending upon the cases they study. 
Carter and Stone investigated voting behavior in the UN general assembly and its 
correlation with foreign aid between countries. The scholars found a positive correlation between 
how a developing country voted and an increase of foreign aid prior to or immediately after the 
vote reached the floor of the general assembly. Their research concluded with the fact that the 
developed world is able to influence the geopolitical positions of foreign aid recipients. There 
work is an important step to understanding how political influence in the developing world 
manifests itself ( Carter & Stone 2014).
The independence of colonies came at a complex time in the global scene. With the onset 
of the cold war, the new influx of independent nations were up for grabs in the new global order, 
as world powers rushed to expand their spheres of influence. Keese found, which ties with 
western countries was relatively limited initially, but as the Soviet Union began expanding its 
influence across the globe, the west began doing the same (Keese 2007). He asserts that in 
Africa, specifically in former French colonies, considerable influence was sought, as the risks for 
communist expansion increased. He notes this in France’s relationship to Ivory Coast as 
neighboring Marxist Ghana under Nkrumah developed close ties with the Chinese and Soviets 
(1966). He concludes by suggesting that despite the fact the cold war is over, the west had 
established a presence and will likely strengthen it as China becomes more influential on the 
continent. 






While some newly independent countries looked for guidance from the west, others were 
coerced by western countries fearful of communist expansion. Most of sub-Saharan Africa 
remains under the sphere of influence of one global power or another. How African countries 
balance their own interests with that of their powerful commercial and political allies abroad,  is 
what I aim to answer in the context of Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon. Now that we have addressed the 
prominent literature on the subject and provided the theoretical bedrock of the investigation, we 




















 To address these questions I will closely investigate Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon. The two 
states differ in size, demographics, history and economic identity.  First, Gabon has a population 
that dwarfs that of Côte d’Ivoire with only about 1.7 million to 22 million. Second, Gabon has 
had a relatively peaceful history, unlike Côte d’Ivoire, which has had two civil wars. Third, 
Gabon has a single resource based economy; oil, where Côte d’Ivoire’s is more diversified with a 
large cocoa and oil export market. Perhaps more important than their differences are their 
similarities. Both countries have seen rapid economic growth in the past few years, both partially 
if not fully fueled by a rise in crude oil extraction. Both had nearly 100 years of French direct 
rule where a system of assimilation was used to administer the territory. Both countries to this 
day retain very close political and commercial relationships with France. It is the commercial ties 
and their effects, which I aim to analyze by qualitatively investigating the nature of French 
multinational corporations operations in Gabon and Côte d’Ivoire’s economy. A comparison of 
two countries with vastly different population sizes and economies, both former French colonies, 
will allow us to see to what extent the dependency theorist’s interpretation or the Modernist 
perspective on growth better suits the true nature of their relationship. 
 Formally, we can make three broad hypotheses.  
H1: French economic dominance through multinational corporations in its former colonies can 







This hypothesis is a core premise of the Dependency Theorist's critique of multinational 
presence in developing economy. If we find that governance and democracy are strengthened 
with foreign investment, we will provide support for the Modernist perspective. It is worth 
briefly noting that for many Dependency Theorists, the concept of liberal-democracy is not 
always a goal and that in fact, more authoritarian structures of government might be favorable in 
heterogeneous societies.  
H2: The economies of Gabon and Côte d’Ivoire have benefited from French multinational 
presence.  
This hypothesis recognizes the benefits of foreign economic presence, a central argument 
from the modernist perspective. Rapid economic growth, access to export markets, electrification 
and access to clean water has been made possible with foreign investment. If we prove this 
hypothesis we will be providing evidence in favor of the modernist perspective.  
H3: The benefits of French investment are disproportionately distributed in favor of the local 
upper class. 
This hypothesis supports the Dependency Theorist’s argument against foreign 
investment. If we find that the distributional effects are less concentrated and that foreign 
investment benefits large portions of the population, the modernist understanding is supported.  
Before discussing the distributional and political effects, I will first address the political 
and historical relationship between France and our cases with emphasis placed upon personal 
ties, followed by an in-depth investigation of foreign direct investment originating from France 
to specific economic sectors in either case. Both cases will have a discussion on the Utility, 






Finance, Telecom, Logistics and oil industries. Additionally, each country has one unique sector, 
which will be addressed, in detail, which for Côte d’Ivoire is cocoa, and for Gabon, uranium. 
Once I have outlined these industries, an analysis of the role of French corporations and their 
positive and negative effects on the civilian population will materialize.  
In order to make judgments on the benefits and costs of foreign direct investment, 
extensive use of economic data will be utilized. Statistics on income distribution, GDP growth 
and other relevant economic indicators will strengthen conclusions about the adopted 
hypotheses. Data pertaining to country’s level of democracy will also be consulted to approach 
H1. Because no one index can fully account for the for all of the influences on a country’s 
democracy, I will consult three well-regarded metrics (Freedom house score, Polity Score, 













IV. Côte d’Ivoire 
i. History and Political Ties 
!
In order to effectively grasp the political and economic relationship between France and 
Côte d’Ivoire, a discussion of their long complicated history is warranted. For the purposes of 
this work, discussion will be limited to the colonial and postcolonial period though it should be 
noted that there were rich cultures and societies living in the region before French rule. By 
limiting our historical scope to the period after the people of Côte d’Ivoire had significant 
contact with Europeans; we are effectively adopting a structural-functionalist paradigm when 
observing the history of the West African State and effectively undervaluing the richness of pre-
Colonial history.   
Côte d’Ivoire did not have any permanent colonial presence until the 1840s and, even 
then, control over the full breadth of the region was not secured until the late 1890s.   The 
shallow ports along the Gold Coast initially confined the French to the coastline, establishing a 
monopoly of power first in the coastal town of Grand-Bassam.  From its establishment, the 
colony of Côte d’Ivoire was an economic enterprise. The French levied a number of taxes on the 
local population to pay for the region’s administration. While the French sought primarily to 
maximize economic output and profit, primarily derived from cocoa production at this time, the 
French also invested heavily in education, especially language education.  Building infrastructure 
was also a French priority, which was made possible by the imposition of a local draft, 







practice was one expression of the larger ‘Code de l'indigénat’, which established and 
systematized the unequal relationship between the colonial French and the indigenous peoples. 
(Houphouet-Boigny 1957). 
For all the commonalities among French sub-Saharan colonies in Africa, Côte d’Ivoire 
was and remains unique. At the height of French rule, around the end of the 18th century, the 
colonial administration facilitated the immigration of foreigners to buttress the economy. For 
instance, during the interwar period, the French facilitated the movement of 100,000 Lebanese to 
the region to serve partially as a merchant class (S. 2011). The French preferred to deal with 
immigrant Lebanese rather than allow local Africans accumulate capital lest increased wealth 
encourage anti-French sentiment ("Ivory coast profile"). There also was a relatively large French 
civilian population in the country, unlike most other sub-Saharan colonies. That population 
reached 80,000 in 1980 but had steadily grown from a small community along the coast in the 
early 1900s. Following the unrest during the second Ivorian civil war, the majority of the white 
population left for France (Xie 2014).  
The French leaders and bureaucrats who governed, the French businessmen who ran the 
economy, and French civilians who sustained a French society and culture in Côte d’Ivoire 
dominated the country well into the 20thcentury.   Assimilation was required of indigenous 
peoples who wanted to succeed; only by adapting to and embracing French culture, religion, 
customs, and language could locals thrive.  During the first half of the 20th century, Côte 
d’Ivoire’s economic and trade ties and dependencies grew ever stronger with France,  reducing 







some political authority to locals and set the stage for political independence for all of French 
West Africa (Zartman 1976).   
On the 3 November 1960, President Félix Houphouët-Boigny became the first president 
of Côte d’Ivoire. A French citizen and a member of the Assembly National who had also held 
various ministerial positions in Paris, Boigny was a dynamic leader who embraced the role as 
France’s economic and security arm in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 1961 the Franco-Ivoirian 
Technical Military Assistance Accord was signed, formalizing a special bilateral relationship 
with their former administrators. The agreement elevated the French ambassador to the country 
to a “Dean” position giving him more diplomatic clout in Paris and Abidjan (Yahya 1994). The 
Boigny regime gave the French the mandate to provide security, allowing the French to deploy 
military forces at will. He established one-party rule under his own ‘Parti démocratique de Côte 
d’Ivoire.’ He has been referred to as the poster child for Françeafrique, surrounding himself with 
French advisors. The early years of Boigny’s reign marked an economic era known as the 
‘Ivorian Miracle,’ noted for political stability and economic growth.  After independence, 
Boigny opened the country was opened to capital investment from countries other than France 
(Toungara, 1986); Abidjan became a central economic hub for West Africa.  Foreign investment 
into cocoa production rose sharply, quickly making the country the largest cocoa exporter in the 
world (“Ivory Coast: What Price Prosperity”, 1970)(Bovcon 2009). The country saw steady 
growth rates for two decades.  Meanwhile, Boigny also enthusiastically supported French 
endeavors in their former colonies, by, for example, providing arms to anti-communist forces in 
neighboring countries (Akarue 2004).  He was also willing to facilitate a number of covert 







 Despite Boigny's accomplishments over his 33-year reign, his legacy was mixed indeed.  
Before his death in 1993, he had amassed tremendous wealth, estimated at $11 billion (Hellweg 
2014).  He also oversaw Côte d’Ivoire’s economic decline, accelerated by population growth, as 
well as difficulties in the cocoa industry; and profligate spending.  For instance, to sustain labor 
intensive cocoa production,  Boigny had encouraged immigration from neighboring countries, 
specifically Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Mauritania (Schuerkens 2003), swelling the 
population. Cocoa production also decreased due to poor soil management practices and world 
cocoa prices also had taken a hit.  The devout Catholic Boigny also poured millions into the 
construction of the world’s largest Cathedral in his hometown Yamoussoukro in central Côte 
d’Ivoire. Boigny made Yamoussoukro the country's seat of government though Abidjan still 
remains the country's de facto capital. After five years and $300 million that might have been 
spent elsewhere, the Cathedral was done but remained a white elephant, unused ("Ivory coast 
profile”)(Toungara 1986). Perhaps Boigny’s greatest disservice to the country was not preparing 
the ground for a successor. Following his death in December of 1993, the country unraveled into 
turmoil.   
Over the next 7 years, Côte d’Ivoire saw a series of short-lived regimes, all of which 
Paris supported either explicitly or otherwise (Bovcon 2009).  Ascending to the presidency after 
Boigny’s death was Henri Konan Bédié. Former ambassador to the United States and Canada 
and a Finance minister under Boigny, Bédié announced that he was president on state television 
hours after Boigny's death. Educated in France Bédié was a Francophile just as his predecessor 
had been. After promising elections soon after taking power, in 1995 Bédié handily won the 







skimming tens of millions of dollars from the coffers in Abidjan every year. Bédié’s rule also 
saw a steady rise of political imprisonment particularly students interested in transparency and 
democracy.  It was also during Bédie’s reign that xenophobic sentiment in the country grew 
(Hellweg 2014) with the idea of ‘Ivoirité' becoming dominant during this period. Those 
immigrants from neighboring countries who had arrived in search of work under Boigny were 
seeing a major backlash from the ‘real Ivorians.'  The divide was at first ethnic, but developed 
into one of a sectarian nature, dividing Christians and the mostly immigrant Muslims, who 
originated in the mostly Muslim Sahel. (Zavis 2004).  A weakening economy and anti-immigrant 
sentiment erupted in a military coup d'état ousting Bédié in December of 1999. catapulting 
General Robert Guéï to the presidency (Hellweg, 2014).  Guéï would only rule for 10 months 
when our next major actor landed on the scene. On 26 October 2000, Laurent Gbagbo and his 
comrades in the military decided Guéï was wrong for Côte d’Ivoire, and, in a sort of soft coup, 
forced Guéï to abdicate in October of 2000 to Gbagbo (Essa 2011). 
 Although Paris forged working ties with Bédié and Guéï (Akarue 2004),   their unstable 
tenures would usher in a new era that would see Paris assert itself in subsequent leadership 
changes later on flexing more direct influence than they had since Boigny's rule.  Bédié, in 
particular, boasted strong relations with both French Presidents Mitterrand and Chirac, and Guéi 
was at least tolerated by Paris during his short tenure (Essa 2011).   
 Gbagbo’s rise to power, by contrast, was not taken particularly well in Paris, yet the 
French allowed him his shot in unifying the increasingly unstable Côte d’Ivoire (Djezou, 2014). 
Gbagbo received a Ph.D. from Paris's Diderot University and was cordial with French deputies 







cocoa prices and several seasons of bad cocoa harvests, Gbagbo exploited growing xenophobia 
in the country, and, in essence, blamed the Muslim immigrants for the country's woes.  He 
passed a law effectively disenfranchising all Ivorians unable to prove both parents were native 
Ivorian.  Twenty-five percent of the country, mostly those living in the north, sons and daughters 
of Sahelian immigrants lost the right to vote.  The backlash eventually fueled the armed struggle 
against Gbagbo's rule led by former Guillaume Soro who was also educated in France, in 
September 2002 (Akarue 2004).  
This five-year guerilla insurgency would cement France’s direct role Côte d’Ivoire. The 
insurgency began in the north following a mutiny by mostly Muslim Ivorian military battalions 
(Essa 2011). The French were quick to deploy a reaction force to the country to protect French 
nationals and business interests. In 2004, Gbagbo, amid rising anger with the French community 
he saw as siding with the Soro-led insurgency, ordered an aircraft to strike a French barracks, 
killing 9 troops (Hellweg 2014). The French swiftly retaliated with airstrikes from jets stationed 
in Gabon.  Despite the strain in Franco-Ivorian relations, the French stopped short of removing 
Gbagbo, likely due to the lack of a plan to transition power away from him (Busch 2008).  Still, 
the French maintained their presence in the country. The civil war continued until March of 2007 
when Soro and Gbagbo reached a peace settlement, leaving Gbagbo as President and awarding 
the position of Prime Minister to Soro (“Ivory coast profile”).   
Instability continued, however.  Gbagbo postponed scheduled presidential elections in 
2008, relenting in 2010, holding them, as the 2007 cease-fire had demanded.  Gbagbo won the 
election handily, but the legitimacy of the results was questioned immediately (Hellweg 2014).  







Boigny and Deputy chief of the IMF, took the lead in this fight to remove Gbagbo, demanding a 
recount. When Gbagbo refused to recount, Ouattara's supporters in the military and in the streets 
armed themselves sparking a second armed struggle against Gbagbo’s regime. Unlike most 
Ivorian leaders, Ouattara was educated in the United States but married a French business mogul. 
In November of 2010, the Second Ivorian Civil War, sometimes called the Ivorian crisis, broke 
out.   The French this time made their preference known, favoring Alassane Ouattara over 
Gbagbo, who had by this time run out of friends and supporters in Paris and at home.  After a 
month, most of the military was firmly behind Ouattara.  At the end of March 2011, Ouattara's 
forces entered Abidjan with the intention of arresting Gbagbo. After days of fierce clashes and 
alleged skirmishes between the French troops Gbagbo loyalists, Ouattara's forces arrested 
Gbagbo in his residence outside the city, although some eyewitness reports suggested the 
involvement of French special forces in the arrest (Hellweg 2014).  
On the 11th of April of 2011, Ouattara secured control of the presidency and was quickly 
recognized by Paris. Though Gbagbo claimed Ouattara was working on behalf of neo-colonial 
powers, whether or not French or American interests masterminded his overthrow is unknown 
(Smith 2011). Gbagbo would soon find himself in the custody of the International Criminal 
Court fighting charges of crimes against humanity for the actions he directed his supporters to 
commit before the Second Ivorian Civil War.   During this period Gbagbo allegedly encouraged 
supporters to attack, rape, and torture those who weren't sufficiently Ivorian, that is, have 
Ivoirité. Gbagbo became the first world leader to be tried in the ICC (Smith 2011).  Meanwhile, 







(Djezou 2014). The French retain a military presence in the country has remained constant since 
their arrival during the first conflict. 
The French military commitment has expanded and diversified since. Following the start 
of Operation Serval in 2013, which saw the deployment of 3,000 French troops in Mali to fight 
off advances made by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the number of troops deployed 
increased by several hundred. Today, the  French military presence grew bigger still following a 
terror attack at a resort in Grand-Bassam in 2016 that saw 14 civilians killed, including one 
Frenchman.  As AQIM's reach has expanded, so has that of the French, which now has a military 
presence in Senegal, Mali, Chad, Niger, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Central African Republic, 
Djibouti, and Burkina Faso, in addition to the presumed deployment of special forces in Libya 
(Bender, 2015).  
A comprehensive understanding of the history of this West African state is vital before 
fully delving into the complex economic relationship between the French Republic and Côte 
d’Ivoire. It goes without saying the French have tolerated authoritarian rule in Côte d’Ivoire, it 
appeared that only as French nationals were being explicitly targeted when military intervention 
was undertaken.  
ii. Economic Overview 
 
Now that we have set the stage, we are now able to discuss France’s complex economic 







economic profile is essential.  First, Côte d’Ivoire has a population of just over 21 million 
people. Its climate is tropical/equatorial in nature. This fact makes the country an ideal place for 
agriculture. The region is endowed with fertile soil making it the world’s largest producer of 
cocoa and among the top producers of palm oil and coffee. In 2015, Côte d’Ivoire produced 40% 
of world cocoa production, employing roughly 60 percent of the country’s labor force (Ford, 
2016).  Côte d’Ivoire also benefits from its substantial oil reserves off of the country’s 
southeastern coast, allowing the country to export 48,000 barrels of crude oil a day as of 2012 
(“Ivory Coast” 2012). Using the CFA Franc as their primary currency, Côte d’Ivoire’s economy 
is monetarily tied to that of Senegal, Niger, Benin, Mali, Burkina Faso, Togo and Guinea-Bissau.  
The country has a budding industrial sector that makes up about 20% of the nation’s GDP 
(“Ivory Coast Trade” 2014). Despite having this sector, only a fraction of its manufacturing 
produces finished products. The sector lacks proper or sufficient capital investment. Since 2012 
the country has seen rapid growth. An influx of FDI contributed to the growth rate of 8.5 percent 
in 2014 (Table 1).  Despite growing at a steady pace, 42 percent of the country lives below the 
poverty line, and the country continues to suffer from high infant mortality rate,  low life 
expectancy, and high fertility, all of which have economic impacts (Figure VX, Figure XVI, 
Figure XIV, Table 5).  In addition, less than half of the country is literate and an estimated 1.7 
million children are thought to be in the labor force.  Despite suffering from endemic poverty, 
the country is rapidly urbanizing and a growing service sector shows promise (“Côte d’Ivoire” 
2014).  While Ivorians are optimistic, modern Côte d’Ivoire’s economic indicators are not where 









During the French colonial period, France tightly controlled the economy of Côte 
d’Ivoire, extracting its resources to support French industry, (Jackson, 1962), while creating a 
market for French exports. France also invested heavily in the agriculture sector and limited the 
country’s ability to trade outside of the francophone bloc.  As imports from Côte d’Ivoire and 
other African colonies flowed in, French consumer goods and finished products flowed back out 
into her African colonial markets. Sixty-eight years of French colonial administration had 
established durable trade and economic links between the two regions. 
 After independence, however, it was up to the Ivorians to organize their new economy 
and political life with intimate help from French advisors whom Boigny surrounded himself.  
Côte d’Ivoire had to spark investment and increase production, while simultaneously shaping a 
new political system. (“Ivory Coast: What Price Prosperity” 1970).  Their efforts to develop 
trade relations with the entire world were rather lackluster in these early days, ultimately leaving 
the French as the most important trade partner for the years to come.  
A description of these two nation’s exchange is a necessary step before analyzing their 
trade arrangements. First, it should be noted that even today, France has a positive trade balance 
with Côte d’Ivoire.  While French products account for about 12 percent of Ivorian imports, only 
about 7 percent of Ivorian exports are destined for France (“Côte d’Ivoire” OEC). Such a trade 
balance is relatively uncommon for developing and developed countries to share. The 







trade ties with local partners, such as Nigeria and Morocco, and with increasingly influential 
countries like China and India (“Côte d’Ivoire” OEC).  
It is not the rate of trade between the two countries that is so telling, but the type and 
nature of trade that binds the two countries.  Over half of Ivorian exports to France are cocoa 
products. This is not surprising considering that cocoa remains Côte d’Ivoire’s most important 
agricultural product and the lifeblood of the Ivorian economy.  While agriculture, including 
bananas and palm oil, is a major driver to trade, Côte d’Ivoire’s manufactured has grown over 
time too.  For example, the country also produces armored vehicles for an Emirati company, 
which account for another 15% of exports to France (“Côte d’Ivoire”, OEC). As far as French 
exports to Côte d’Ivoire, wheat and medicines make up about 20 percent collectively with the 
rest being made up of a diverse array of finished products for consumers and industries. (“Côte 
d’Ivoire”, CIA).  
Trade between France and Abidjan is not only bilateral; both countries also benefit from 
multilateral agreements, especially the free trade agreement between Abidjan and the European 
Union.  The French are believed to have been the drivers of the agreement between the EU and 
Côte d’Ivoire, building on the Cotonou Agreements—negotiations on the reductions of tariffs—
with the EU in 2000, and served as the negotiators on the EU’s behalf of the updated agreement 
with Brussels (Bovcon 2009). When the agreement was finalized in 2008, Côte d’Ivoire saw an 
uptick in trade with countries like Spain, Italy and Germany.   Just as Abidjan benefitted from 
expanded trade ties with other EU states, France also made sure that the French ties would not 
suffer in the process. As a result, bilateral trade remains strong and an important feature of the 







The implications of this trade relationship are that the Ivorian economy is reliant upon 
French manufactured goods. The relationship mirrors that discussed by dependency theorists 
who worry about the effect this trade arrangement have. Still, with less than 15% of imports 
coming from France, the degree that the country is ‘dependent' upon that trade link is likely less 
than a vehement anti-imperialist might claim. Given the differences in income, most French 
products exported to Côte d’Ivoire are likely luxury goods consumed by the economic elite. 
iv. Foreign Direct Investment 
 
 Historical relations served to solidify relationships between French diplomats, 
businessmen, and Ivorian politicians. Mutually beneficial agreements, often behind closed doors 
were and remain common across France’s former colonies, particularly those where leaders have 
long tenures.  Côte d’Ivoire is no exception. A French capitalist looking to invest in Côte 
d’Ivoire will come across a network of French corporations and powerful capitalists who have 
been operating in the country for decades.  Even so-called domestic industries are rarely owned 
by Ivoirians themselves; most are conglomerates controlled by large multinational French firms 
that have been in operation since independence (Busch 2008).  The types of industries the French 
invest tell us a lot about broader French objectives in the region.  
Very little foreign capital is directed to secondary goods production. The reason being, 
building manufacturing plants incur high starting costs. Lack of technology puts these countries 
at a disadvantage in operating costs. Because most foreign capital avoids manufacturing industry, 







resource production than in secondary goods. This phenomenon is what Singer and Prebisch 
hypothesized, in Côte D'Ivoire it appears that their idea finds some practical support. 
As far as general trends, we have seen fairly consistent amounts of French FDI flowing 
into the country from year to year as reported by the OECD. In 2012 there was an estimated $1.4 
billion invested in the country of French origins (Table 3). The following section will detail the 
most prominent sectors and the amounts of French direct and indirect involvement. Côte 
D’Ivoire attracts foreign direct investment from all over the world including Germany and the 
United States.  
1. Utilities and Logistics 
 
Several French companies have historically run Ivorian utilities. Most road and rail 
infrastructure investment and the development of the port of Abidjan were financed by the 
French private sector.  Today, Ivorian energy is produced and run by “Compagnie Ivoirienne 
d'électricité” (CIE). Water is provided by “Société de distribution d'eau de la Côte d’Ivoire” 
(SODECI) (“Notre Groupe”) (“Sodeci”). French utility giant Eranove owns and controls both 
water and electric firms, having taken them over from Bougyes in 2005.   Eranove is a private 
company without any Ivorian   ownership stake (“Our Stockholders”). This effectively limits 
Abidjan’s ability to manage these utilities.  Access to clean water has improved in recent years. 
As of 2015, 81% of Ivorians had access to clean water, an increase of almost 10% in 1990 (FAO 
2015). Meanwhile, CIE with French financing was instrumental in building four large 







the country’s total electricity (Wilson 2015). It is important to note that most of rural Côte 
d’Ivoire has yet be become electrified and to this day the country struggles with fulfilling the 
energy demand (“Notre Groupe"). This arrangement has some additional negative externalities. 
With private ownership of utilities, there is a difficulty with accountability when blackouts 
occur, which in Côte d’Ivoire are common. To whom do people complain? In terms of electrical 
connection, there is near endemic difficulties with people illegally connecting to the electrical 
grid without paying so companies lack the incentive to expand service to unplanned urban or 
rural areas (Wilson 2015). Lastly, because of the repayments are difficult to collect, utilities 
prioritize more affluent areas at the expense of poor communities. With only about 30% of rural 
Ivoirians and almost 90% for urban Ivoirians having access to electricity and with consumption 
per capita steadily rising the need for more electricity sources will rise in the coming years 
(World Bank-Côte d’Ivoire  2012)(Figure IX).  
Two transportation firms dominate the country’s logistics industry, Leon Vincent and 
Bolloré, formerly SDV.  Bolloré operates the Abidjan terminal that transits exports and imports 
to Côte d’Ivoire and other countries in West Africa such as Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali.  
Bolloré also received the rights to building a vital bridge in the capital city after negotiations 
with a Chinese logistics firm collapsed under unknown circumstances (“The French African 
Connection” 2014). Bolloré has virtually complete control of road and rail transit in the country 
and the links to neighboring countries (“Bolloré Logistics”).  In 2014 Bolloré was contracted to 
build and operate a second import terminal in Abidjan despite an alleged lower bid offered by a 
Swiss company (“The French African Connection” 2014). Just as in the bridge construction, 







over others. Bolloré hailed their railroad project connecting Abidjan to Burkina Faso for its 
benefit to the local population despite 40 of the 52 weekly trains carry raw materials, like gold 
and zinc the  (Bolloré Logistics). Côte d’Ivoire, with the help of French investment, has become 
a logistics hub for much of francophone West Africa, with Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger all 
using the terminals along the coast. This new role has provided economic benefits to the state 
and population as a whole. 
With the country's transport and utilities in the hands of the French, Abidjan has been 
severely limited in its ability to impose regulations on these industries.  Moreover, Ivorian 
leaders often have little to gain by aggravating the French on whose capital investment and 
business relationships, generally, they depend. Nationalizing utilities and logistics would be 
virtually impossible.  Even while independent, Côte d’Ivoire remains very much dependent on 
France for investment and management of its utilities and infrastructure. The worry for the 
dependency theorist is to what degree is it possible for private enterprise to prioritize societal 
welfare over profit. Whether or not infrastructure is built for the populous or for the use of 
industry is questionable, we certainly have evidence to suggest the latter.  Moreover, to what 
degree can a government influence private business decision-making?  With such a rapidly 










Once the market for cellular technology opened in Côte D’Ivoire, French telecom giant, 
Orange, was quick to set up shop.  Orange enjoyed a virtual monopoly in the market until 
competing South African Telecom Giant MTN joined the market several years later. Orange still 
slightly leads in the number of subscribers, estimated at about 8 million (Lancaster, 2008). The 
country is the third largest market for telecommunications in sub-Saharan Africa. Orange had 
gains of about $524mil in 2004 alone, leading the local market. The job was made easier in late 
2015 when the minster of telecommunications decided to officially limit the number of local 
carriers to three (Bellamy, Williams, 2011). Orange and MTN were able to absorb business lost 
when the 3 smaller providers were forced to merge their local business. Orange, which invested 
heavily in the country's internet infrastructure early on, also managed to be the only provider of 
internet into Côte d’Ivoire as of 2008 (Lancaster, 2008). In 2016, Orange had the opportunity to 
merge with the country’s only landline provider, one owned and operated by Ivoirians, further 
strengthening France’s role in the critical telecom market (“Côte d’Ivoire”, Telegeography). 
Today, the average Ivorian has 1.2 mobile subscriptions and is trending upward (Figure IIX). 
The country is only expected to see an increase in mobile users, especially as mobile banking 
proliferates the formal economy. Jeffery Sachs and other prominent development economists 











Some oil deposits had been tapped in Côte d’Ivoire in the 1940s. It was not until 1972 
when reserves in the Gulf of Guinea were discovered. Quickly, a state-run corporation was 
formed with significant capital flooding into the industry from France. PETROCI became the 
official overseer of the various corporations that began permanently setting up shop in Abidjan's 
European quarter by the early 1980s ("Petroci – Holding”).   Elf, then a French state-run oil 
institution, already with significant investments and interests in the Gulf of Guinea, was awarded 
a stake. Elf in Gabon had already been well developed and operations had expanded to the 
Republic of Congo by the time oil was struck in Côte d’Ivoire’s territorial waters. With the help 
of powerful Parisian banks like Société General and BNP Paribas (Soumahoro, 2007), Ivorian 
companies began to spring up to serve supporting roles in oil production and management. Elf, 
and what would later be bought by TOTAL, owned a 37% of GESTOCI, an Ivorian investment 
bank in the oil industry that managed a majority of assets in the oil industry (“History Of The 
Gestoci”). Unlike the transport and utilities industries, Ivorians have had a larger financial stake 
in the oil industry.  French capital still drives local oil industry, but Ivorians over the years have 
been able to increase the local stake in oil in contrast to their involvement in utilities, major 
transport, and telecom industries. 
TOTAL has had a stable relationship with Côte d’Ivoire, even through both civil 
conflicts. Despite the French government having poor relations with Gbagbo, once he took 
power he freed up much of the local oil market to further investment. Societe Ivorienne de 







secured a 25% stake in the company, though 45% of shares are still owned by PETROCI 
(“Petroci – Holding”). In 2004 the last year data is available, TOTAL’s net profits from their 
wells in Côte d’Ivoire's netted them $203mil. Needless to say, there has been ample investment 
by the French into the Ivorian oil industry ("Total in Ivory Coast”, 2016). Interestingly the 
French import very few petrochemicals directly from Côte d’Ivoire, instead, most are destined 
for local countries not blessed with Oil reserves, like Togo, Burkina Faso and Mali. The industry 
is growing fast; by 2020 the country hopes to be producing 200,000 barrels a day (Parakova, 
2016).  
The French are heavily involved in oil production in Côte d’Ivoire, prospects for further 
privatization in the future are likely, which will necessarily benefit TOTAL. The oil industry is 
not a labor-intensive industry; as such it employs mostly French engineers. The oil industry has 
driven economic growth in recent years. With the cocoa industry vulnerable to supply shocks, 
the oil industry has become a stable sector in an otherwise sensitive economy. Legally, the state 
of Côte d’Ivoire has ownership of all hydrocarbons within its sovereign territory, thus a bidding 
system operates to reward companies with rights when bids are competitive. Even with this 
system, TOTAL receives the vast majority of licenses. Oil rents only make up a fraction of the 










4. Finance  
!
Like much of sub-Saharan Africa, Côte d’Ivoire is in desperate need of foreign capital 
investment. At the time of independence, Boigny was particularly friendly to representatives of 
Societe General who made their way to Abidjan. Operating in the country since the 1960s, 
Societe General is firmly rooted. Domestic banks only account for about 20% of the banking 
sector, and the rest are foreign (“World Bank-Côte d’Ivoire” 2017). Another major player in the 
finance market in Ivory Coast is “Banque Internationale Pour Le Commerce Et L'industrie.” The 
firm is run by BNP Paribas another French bank, and like Socitete General has been operating in 
the country since the 1960s (Owusu, Odhiambo, 2012). Competition was made easier when 
banking regulations were modified in January 1995 when small investment banks were forced to 
merge their operations. APBEF was established to unify these smaller banks under an umbrella 
corporation (“APBF-CI”). A French firm was again able to capitalize on the restructuring of 
local business banks and attract further business from capital consumers in the country (Owusu, 
Odhiambo, 2012). By contrast, French banks operating in the country were not force to merge 
with any other corporation (Bellamy, Williams, 2011). 
The banking sector in Ivory Coast has been and remains relatively weak. Borrowing in 
the private sector was stagnant for decades, especially during Gbagbo’s tenure. The financial 
sector in the country is able to provide credit to slightly over 30% of its GDP. To put that into 
perspective, France’s financial sector can provide credit of nearly 150% of GDP.  Investment has 
been on the rise, much of that has been made in the growing telecom and energy industries. 







banking industry (“Can west Africa's jewel regain its shine?” 2012). The central and northern 
regions of the country, despite being where most cocoa production in based. see very little 
financial activity. Today, only about 200 people of every 1,000 citizens are depositors in banks, 
most rely on mobile banking (Figure V).  
French institutions dominate the finance industry of Côte d’Ivoire. When looking for 
capital it is almost unavoidable to interact with some French bank or another (Darby, Zucker, 
2006).  Recent years have seen a rise in domestically generated capital but still only makes up a 
fraction of total capital in the economy. Ultimately, French financial institutions have benefited 
greatly from their position in the country. Because of the size of the informal sector of the 
economy, most people lack formal incomes and millions live without formal addresses, so for 
many, setting up a bank account is a difficult endeavor. Able to choose who and who not to 
provide credit, foreign financial institutions prefer to direct funds toward formal industries, 
whereas the majority of Ivorian citizens have not had access to that credit. 
5. Cocoa    
 
Cocoa production in Côte d’Ivoire is unique.  Although the country is the largest cocoa 
producer in the world, small family operations, not large mono-crop plantations produce 90 
percent of production employing nearly 1 million Ivoirians (Ibo, 1995).  Like many agricultural 
products that serve as inputs to expensive food products abroad, Ivorian cocoa producers see a 
fraction of what European chocolate companies earn. The structure of the cocoa market in Côte 
d’Ivoire is unique. A government-owned firm serves as the only Cocoa buyer. This monopsony 







received $1.25 for a kilogram of cocoa (Mieu & Jha 2016). The government then sells those 
products to large candy companies like Nestle and Cargill reaping handsome profits. Among 
cocoa producers, Côte d’Ivoire consistently is able to underbid labor (“Cote d'Ivoire Human 
Rights Report” 2015). Unfortunately, this system allows for widespread child labor abuses, 
particularly in the northern region of the country forcing the government, in 2015, to enforce 
strict labor codes. Despite the measure, child labor remains prevalent as the country lacks the 
capacity to freely educate all citizens in primary schools, leaving students without prospects for 
education and forcing them into the labor force (Hailey, 2014). Millions of the migrants from 
Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger work on Cocoa plantations across the country. Between 2003 and 
2008 annual outgoing remittances increased from $628M- $756M (“World Bank dataset- Côte 
d’Ivoire”) The industry has not only benefited Côte D’Ivoire’s economy but also the economies 
of its Northern neighbors.  
As previously stated, Côte d’Ivoire is the largest cocoa producer in the world. Despite the 
French’s iconic sweet tooth, the country does not boast any major cocoa producers aside from 
Cemoi, who only recently began operating permanently in Côte d’Ivoire in 2015 (“French 
chocolate maker…”, 2015). In fact, the majority of investment into the cocoa trade comes from 
several very large cocoa commodity holders. The largest in Côte d’Ivoire is Cargill, an American 
agro-business giant. Other major investors into the cocoa trade in Côte d’Ivoire are commodity 
houses based in Switzerland and in the UK. This does not come as a surprise when one realizes 
that Nestle and Cadbury have significant interests in the industry. Just behind Cargill, in terms of 
the largest cocoa companies operating in the country, is SIFCA, a conglomerate of a number of 







French corporations listed under its umbrella, but the majority of partners are based in other 
European countries ("Sweet Dreams", 2010).  Cocoa products do makeup 46% of French imports 
from Côte d’Ivoire. The European market imports over 60% of all cocoa exports for Côte 
d’Ivoire, with the Netherlands importing the largest percentage followed by France and Germany 
(“Côte d’Ivoire” OEC).  
The cocoa industry in Côte d’Ivoire may be the only major economic force in the country 
that French firms do not monopolize, although other foreign firms dominate it.  Still, the French 
earn much indirectly from cocoa production via French control of Ivorian financial firms and 
infrastructure that facilitates the export of cocoa abroad.  Even without their hand directly in 
cocoa production, the French are the net gainer, with the Ivorian cocoa cultivators reaping 
relatively few benefits and remaining in poverty.  
Now with the background on the degree to which French companies dominate various 
industries n Côte d’Ivoire, it is important to access how the French economic presence has 
affected Ivorian economic sovereignty has been reduced.    French corporations have been 
operating in Côte d’Ivoire since independence, yet over time, the Ivorian state has pursued 
greater participation in vital industries.  What are the future prospects for Ivorian ownership of 









v. Discussion  
 
It would be incorrect to suggest that the government in Abidjan has no control over their 
own economy, nor would it be useful to assert that economic ties between Abidjan and Paris give 
the French government any direct authority over the domestic affairs of Côte d’Ivoire.  This 
being said, there are several suitable conclusions to be made about Franco-Ivorian economic ties. 
Firstly, French monopolies over logistics and utilities are explicit. It can be inferred from that, 
that French companies receive special treatment from the Côte d’Ivoiran government, mostly in 
the form of favorable contracts. The logic follows that the mutually beneficial relationship 
between Côte d’Ivoire and French corporations serve to primarily benefit first the institutions 
themselves, second the leadership of Côte d’Ivoire and lastly, the average Ivorian consumer. The 
sorts of market conditions in Côte d’Ivoire are more favorable to French companies than the 
French market itself. With regulation imposing further restrictions on outside competitors from 
entering the market, the stage is set for the French to make major profits.  
Given the favorable attitude toward French business, we may also conclude that interests 
of French businesses are often the same as that of those lawmakers and power holders in Côte 
d’Ivoire. The illicit funneling of money from corporations to powerful lawmakers in African 
countries is not a new phenomenon. That being said, given our information, we have no reason 
to suggest that such behavior is or is not happening. A further take away from this investigation 
is that sometimes the interests of the French government do not align with those of French 
businessmen. We saw supporting evidence during Gbagbo's reign when he privatized large 







civil wars, French companies did not leave the country in droves as the French expatriates did, 
instead, most continued operations or simply suspended them until the conflict ended. During 
both conflicts, corporations were hesitant to take sides, likely knowing full well that their 
investments were secured by either powerful Ivorian’s on both sides of the conflict or the French 
military which was deployed to protect those interests regardless of who came to power.  
History suggests that Ivorian politicians have been willing to make generous concessions 
to French multinational corporations. After both conflicts business either became better or 
continued, as usual, suggesting that perhaps the underlying framework of French dominance in 
the Ivorian economy is the foundation that the Ivorian government is grounded in. It is a 
government’s duty to provide infrastructure and utilities to the populous, services that give a 
government authority and legitimacy. Given that these roles have been assumed by French 
business, undoing the framework might destabilize the nation beyond repair. As it seems today, 
Côte d’Ivoire cannot untangle France from its GDP. Despite the fact that the French are not 
directly involved in the cocoa trade, the industry is still operated by western traders. While 
prospects for growth are good in Côte d’Ivoire, the country’s economy is dependent upon cocoa 
and oil prices on the outside and giant French conglomerates on the inside. A further comparison 
to another country in West Africa with a similar history is necessary to make conclusions about 
neo-colonial practices in France’s former colonies.  
In Côte d’Ivoire's case, does France's intimate position in the country lead to net benefits 
for the country as a whole? It would be instructive to consult relevant data on the country's 
development. Like most sub-Saharan states Côte d’Ivoire is seeing decreasing infant mortality 







steadily gaining access to clean water unities and to electricity. Despite that, we do not see 
significant positive changes in GDP per capita. The structure of the country's largest sector 
allows for the possibility of child labor exploitation and makes the state budget vulnerable to 
supply shocks. With nearly half the population still living in poverty, even seeing an increase of 
nearly 10% since 2008 (Figure X).  Another metric worth addressing is the distribution of 
income. Today the top 20% of the population, about 4 million people, receive about 50% of total 
income a portion that has only deviated slightly since 1985 (Table 5).  Accurate income data is 
extremely difficult to aggregate in countries with large informal economies so it given the large 
portion of the population living below the poverty line there is reason to believe that the 
distribution may be tilted even more toward the upper-income brackets. We might conclude that 
in Côte d’Ivoire’s case we have not seen drastic positive changes to the average Ivorian’s welfare 
in terms of income but has seen modest improvements in quality of life evidenced by a slight 
increase in HDI (Table 4). With rapid economic growth in the country it’s likely we will see 
future benefits to the economy and population as a whole. 
We should also address the level of democracy or lack thereof in the country. It is 
difficult to access how democratic a state is, to do so we will observe several indices that attempt 
to do just that.  Freedom House found that the country has been on a positive downward trend in 
the level of authoritarianism going from 6.0/7.0 in 2005 to 4.5 in 2015 (Table 4). The 
economist’s democracy index puts the country among the least free overall but is also trending 
towards more democracy. Recent legislative elections in the country have only attracted slightly 







participation. If voter participation is an indicator of the strength of a democracy, Côte d’Ivoire is 
not an active democracy (IFES Election Guide 2017). 
 Lastly, the polity project came to some different conclusions, most notably that since the 
first civil war, the central government has consolidated more authority, making their assessment 
of the country the bleakest among our three indices (Figure ii.).  If we accept the Economist and 
Freedom house’s assessment, economic growth seems to correlate with democratization so the 
modernist perspective may be supported. Alternatively, the dependency theorist might note that 
















i. History and Political Ties 
!
Nestled away in the heart of central Africa, a small state exists, although many have 
contended that the territory is less like a country and more like a village (“The French African 
Connection” 2014). With an area roughly the size of Colorado and about a fifth of the 
population, Gabon is a small, generally quiet state, which can boast a long and complex 
relationship with the French Republic. As the previous section, I will be adopting a structural-
functionalist paradigm when observing Gabon's modern economic relations. I adopt this 
paradigm in an attempt to frame the comparison around modern international economic relations, 
not to suggest that the people living in Gabon had not had ample interaction with Europeans up 
until the point of permanent presence by them. By limiting our focus, we can delve deeper into 
the French and Gabonese economic exchange.   
In the early colonial period, Gabon was a small area along the West African coast with a 
modest lumber industry comprising about 75 percent of the economic activity.  Gabon had the 
reputation for being a hideaway for French government officials trying to lay low from bad 
media or scandal. The area was occupied by less than 500,000 people, most of whom where 
Christian (Benquet, 2014). The colonial administration ensured that the French language was 
dominant, replacing most local languages. It was not until independence that the country would 







Independence in 1960 brought about the regime of Léon M’ba. A close ally of de Gaulle, 
M’ba consolidated political power and enforced a single party system (“The French African 
Connection” 2014). M’ba was allegedly reluctant in accepting independence for his country and 
instead preferred to be a territory of France. His reign was challenged in 1964 when a coup 
attempt and popular uprising threatened to oust him. The French acted quickly by deploying 
troops to Libreville to quell the protestors and disarm and arrest the plotters (Benquet, 2014). It 
was widely believed at the time that the Americans plotted his overthrow, leading to a brief row 
between Libreville and Washington. M’ba was forced to change the country’s constitution, 
allowing a multi-party system. By 1967, M’ba had fallen ill. While being treated in Paris, M’ba 
and a gathering of several people of Gabonese decent living in the city appeared on television 
proclaiming a constitutional amendment creating the role of vice president. Omar Bongo was 
tapped for the job in Paris after receiving recommendations from powerful advisors to Charles de 
Gaulle in the executive office in the Élysée Palace, among them Jaques Foccart (Reed, 1987). By 
November of 1967, M’ba’s health had deteriorated and his death brought about a new dynasty in 
Gabonese leadership. Omar Bongo reinstated a single-party system just as M’ba had, effectively 
setting back any democratic process established after the coup in 1967 (Benquet, 2014).  
Omar Bongo was a close ally of de Gaulle and was happy to facilitate clandestine French 
operations through Libreville. During the Nigerian Civil War, Bongo aided the French in their 
program to arm the rebels in Biafra. A coup attempt in Benin in 197  allegedly carried out by 
French proxies, originated in Gabon. Of the conflicts in both the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) and the Republic of Congo, Gabon was the staging point for French troops and 







By the 1980s, oil reserves in the country and just off the coast had finally begun 
producing large amounts of crude oil (Heilbrunn, 2005). The French state-run Oil Corporation 
ELF had capitalized on Gabonese, Congolese, Nigerian, Cameroonian and Angolan oil supply. 
In Gabon, Elf controlled all oil production but their real relationship would not be revealed until 
1993 when allegations surfaced claiming that ELF was paying kickbacks to African leaders, 
especially in Gabon, and French politicians in the National Assembly (Benquet, 2014).  It was 
estimated that $130 million was doled out each year between 1989 and 1993, an estimated two-
fold increase over the yearly sums paid out over the previous decade (Heilbrunn, 2005).   
When the scandal broke, French officials began to distance themselves from Elf's 
leadership. Several executives in the firm were fined and jailed, the CEO doing six months in 
prison himself (Heilbrunn, 2005). The investigation into the bribery and audit of the company 
was halted when French oil giant TOTAL bought the company and any evidence of corruption 
was buried under privacy laws (Benquet, 2014). With only a few businessmen publicly shamed 
and French politicians emerging virtually unscathed, business continued as usual.  Omar Bongo 
himself claimed on live television that his personal relationship with French oil executives and 
politicians still remained intimate. This was perhaps the best example of neo-colonial coercion 
by a former colonizer. The scandal, to most, would be seen as a blatant case of corruption and 
bribery, but, to Bongo, it was nothing more than an inconvenience (Benquet, 2014, Yates, 1996). 
The French government did not once lay blame on Gabon’s government for their explicit 
acceptance of bribes and gifts.  
In 1990, following a period of economic stagnation, unrest was brewing in Libreville, 







2014). Clashes between protestors and police ensued and again a Gabonese president appealed to 
the French to save his position. Initially reluctant to do so, the French caved to requests to quell 
the uprising when Omar Bongo allegedly threatened to give American oil companies more 
access to reserves in the country. Again French commandos protected the Gabonese president 
and again a multi-party system was established with a constitutional amendment decreed by 
Bongo himself (Dickinson, 2009).  This was one illustration of a former colony wielded leverage 
over the former colonizer.  
Omar Bongo was often described as the definition of a Parisian political insider. Omar 
Bongo allegedly provided financial support to rising stars in French politics and had the ear of 
close aides to the French President any time he wanted (Halvorssen, Gladstein, 2016). Owning 
several luxurious homes in Paris and several across France the president was as much of a 
Francophile as one could be. After 41 years in control, Omar Bongo died in 2009 leaving power 
to his son Ali Bongo. Jacques Chirac, Nicolas Sarkozy and ten other African leaders were at 
Omar Bongo's funeral. To put that into perspective, Hollande was the only French president to 
go to Nelson Mandela’s funeral. Succession was smooth and endorsed by the French, despite the 
election results being contested.  When Ali Bongo won his 2009 election Sarkozy received him 
in Paris with open arms.  On the same visit, Ali Bongo bought a number of properties in the city 
as well as luxury vehicles and speedboats (Zaretsky, 2016).  His lavish spending certainly drew 
some suspicion, but Ali Bongo would demonstrate that he was no caricature of a kleptocratic 
autocrat.  In fact, there were signs that he was a savvier political actor than his father, open to 







Ali Bongo embraced the United States far more than his father ever had (Halvorssen, 
Gladstein, 2016).  He was the first African leader to stay in the Blair House, the president's 
official guesthouse, on a state visit to Washington in 2013. This was particularly puzzling 
considering Gabon has a population smaller than the State of Maine but does shed light on the 
growing importance of US-Gabonese ties ("Gabon's president is re-elected", 2016). 
Building closer relations with Americans benefited the country with an influx of 
investment in desperately need infrastructure projects (Halvorssen, Gladstein, 2016). Following 
Ali’s ascension oil infrastructure expanded significantly, raising the country’s GDP per capita to 
over $18,000, while unemployment remained stagnant at 19% with the majority of citizens living 
below the poverty line (Table 1). This same period saw a rise in the country’s urbanization rate 
and a relative decline in the productivity of the country’s small lumber industry (Zaretsky, 2016).  
Most recently, in Gabon’s presidential election in 2016, Ali Bongo won the election with 
only 42percent of the popular vote, but with a 99.78% voter turnout in his home state nearly 
entirely going to him to deliver the election to him (“Gabon's president is re-elected”, 2016). His 
opponent, Jean Ping, claimed the election was fraudulent and contested the results, a claim 
echoed by some in Paris. A Supreme Court ruling ruled in favor of Ali Bongo, and he secured 
another term. Election-related violence persisted for weeks, ultimately leading to the torching of 
the country’s national assembly and the deaths of a number of protesters. Gabon struggled with 
low oil prices and a rising deficit, which too contributed to the discontent of many citizens 
(“Gabon's president is re-elected”, 2016, Zaretsky, 2016). This time, the spate of violence did not 
result in the French deployment of troops to quell the unrest, leaving the task to the local security 







Some have speculated that the French decided not to intervene to help stabilize the 
situation in order to punish Ali Bongo for his outreach to other countries (O’Grady 2016). He has 
expressed interest in developing closer ties with the United States and China. His interest in other 
countries as potential partners has made some in France nervous, but efforts to delink both 
countries politically and economically would be both difficult and probably unwise.  Ali Bongo 
has in the past exposed and convicted illegal behavior from foreign firms (Halvorssen, Gladstein, 
2016).  
Lastly, to put the role of the Gabonese presidency in perspective, when Ali Bongo's win 
was legitimized in Gabon's Supreme Court, congratulations came from Jean-Marie Le-Penn, and 
prominent Republicains and Socialists. French and American diplomats spoke publicly about the 
vast network of contacts the president of Gabon wielded and the many relationships the position 
has with those in Paris (Benquet, 2014). Needless to say, Gabon is a disproportionately powerful 
actor in the region and even wields some political leverage over Paris (Halvorssen, Gladstein, 
2016).  
ii. Economic Overview  
 
Before looking directly at Gabon and France’s close economic relationship, it is 
important to provide a summary of the economic activity in the county. Gabon is heavily reliant 
on oil revenue to balance its annual budget and on French goods to supply to country’s consumer 
market. Today, oil exports account for over 90% of the country’s total exports (Figure II). The 







labor have gradually moved away from the lumber industry and toward oil production, and, more 
recently, uranium prospecting though that sector has slowed in recent years.  With a rising 
poverty rate and few prospects for greater investment in any sector other than energy, the 
country's debts and assets are wholly reliant on the country's resource endowment ("Gabon | 
Statistics").  Gabon has been of particular interest to the French energy sector and their large, 
powerful, partially state-run, nuclear energy company AREVA, which, like TOTAL, has had a 
long presence in sub-Saharan Africa (Reed, 1987). Uranium deposits have been discovered in 
central Gabon, and, although prospecting has yet to begin, AREVA has already set up shop in 
Libreville (Heilbrunn, 2005).  
Both Omar Bongo and his son have expressed interest in diversifying their country’s 
economy.  Attempts have been made to develop tourism, palm oil and lumber industries, but, 
despite increased investment, the productivity of these sectors will not be able to catch up with 
the expanding oil industry. This effectively ties the country’s GDP and budget directly to often-
volatile crude oil prices, making them susceptible to price shocks (Zaretsky, 2016).  
iii. Trade  
 
 Gabon has a small economy to suit its small population. Despite its size, the country 
boasts strong trade ties with a number of European and Asian countries. Once reliant on its 
lumber industry, today, only a fraction of its exports are in any sector other than energy. Over 50 
percent of its exports are destined for Asia.  About 30 percent of its exports are imported by the 







Ninety percent of the exports involve crude oil or other hydrocarbons; of those, the majority is 
destined for Asia("Gabon International Trade”, 2014).  
 As far as imports go, the country is highly reliant on French goods. While only about 22 
percent of those imports come from France itself, a further 25 percent originate in other 
European countries. Today, the European Commission is still working on an EU agreement on 
mutual tariff reduction with Gabon. Given Gabon’s colonial history French negotiators in Paris 
have played a pivotal role in negotiating the agreement (Benquet, 2014). The country adopted the 
Central African franc in 2013, tying its economy to five other states in Central Africa.  Like the 
West African franc, its value is tied to the Euro and fluctuates in parallel fashion.  
 When Gabon's economy began to struggle in the late 1990s, the country was able to negotiate a 
sizable loan in return for a number of privatization policies in a number of sectors of the 
economy, notably the utility and logistics sectors (Yates, 1996).  Other stipulations included both 
the levying of new taxes on the lumber industry while providing further exemptions to foreign 
companies involved in natural resource extraction. These policies allowed for more pervasive 
More recently, with a dip in world oil prices in late 2014, the country's growth, highly reliant on 
oil exports, was stunted. The country struggles to keep its budget positive when prices of crude 
oil are so low, leaving the country to rely on its small timber and palm oil industries to lead 
export-driven growth (Benquet, 2014). As a consequence, Gabon, like many resource-rich 
countries, suffers from so-called "Dutch Disease," which distorts the economy drawing labor and 
capital away from other productive sectors to those that earn higher returns and leaves the 








iv. Foreign Direct Investment 
 
Gabon does not attract significant amounts of FDI, other than in the oil sector.  That 
being said, what market access Gabon provides to foreign firms is worth investigating. Despite 
being so small, infrastructure and services are highly reliant on foreign capital.  Close ties with 
France, for instance, have allowed for capital to flow between both countries fairly easily. The 
relatively large French population also contributes a sizable portion of the country's GDP. Like 
much of former French Africa, French corporations operate in nearly all sectors of the economy 
to various degrees.   
Today, Gabon is the second largest recipient of French foreign direct investment in sub-
Saharan Africa. In 1990, Gabon held over $400 million more French capital invested in its 
economy than Côte d’Ivoire. Within 10 years French private ownership increased a further $350 
million, over $600 million more than Côte d’Ivoire (Table 3). Put in perspective, Gabon’s 
population is 8% of Côte d’Ivoire’s. In 2000, Gabon’s GDP dwarfed that of Côte d’Ivoire by 
nearly billion (Figure XII). Though the majority of this investment was directed toward the oil 
industry, some were certainly directed toward other areas of the economy. 
 
1. Utilities and Logistics 
 
Gabon’s government managed the country’s utilities until 1998 when the IMF required 







were privatized, the multinational French corporation Violia achieved a 51percent share in 
Société d'Énergie et d'Eau du Gabon (SEEG), which administers energy and water in the 
country. Two other large French corporations own minority shares in the firm, GDF Suez and 
SAUR International leaving Gabon’s own government owning about 30%. To Violia’s credit, 
access to clean water and electricity grew sharply after its ownership became official 
(“Historique”). Today, over 90% of the country’s total population has access to clean water 
(Figure XI). It is important to note that the current arrangement reached between the firm and the 
government in Libreville provides that SEEG maintain the exclusive right to (1) produce and 
distribute water to the country and (2) transport and distribution of electrical energy, all while the 
government and SEEG share the right to produce electricity (Bamou, 1999).  
Between 1998 and 20015, about 670 million francs and euros were invested in Gabonese 
utilities by French corporations. This intensified investment and energy production has had some 
negative effects. Weak environmental protection laws allow French firms to engage in profitable 
but environmentally damaging practices (Arditti, 2015).  In 2005, for example, millions of 
additional euros were required to clean up environmental damage caused by several energy 
production plants, a cost that Gabonese government had to bare. (Arditti, 2015). This case alone 
serves to support the hypothesis that French corporations assert more control over Gabon’s 
economy than does the government in Libreville. Because Gabon was forced to allow foreign 
ownership, the government contracts foreign companies rather than domestic ones, which would 
add some growth in the domestic economy.  Despite the foreign ownership, over 95% of the 







90% of the country’s total population, concentrated in towns and villages make connecting 
communities to the electrical grid an easier endeavor (Figure X).  
As far as logistics go, the primary goal for investment in infrastructure in the country is 
transportation and short-term storage of crude oil. The French logistics company Bolleré controls 
both the country’s major ports in Libreville and Port Gentille (“Port of Libreville”). TOTAL also 
has invested in the expansion of these ports as well. Almost all road infrastructure has been 
funded by foreign corporations and maintained by Gabon’s state apparatus. This has led to poor 
infrastructure conditions in nearly all other regions of the country not directly related to foreign 
companies (Arditti, 2015).  This vital sector of the economy is almost entirely controlled by 
French firms. 
2. Telecom  
 
The government administered the telecom industry for decades but following IMF 
restructuring programs, the industry was liberalized. Quickly, a large Moroccan telecom 
company merged with the country's former state-run provider and established market dominance 
(Lancaster, 2016). It is important to note that this Moroccan firm is a subsidiary of French mega 
corporation VIVENDI.  South African telecom companies also compete in the Gabonese market. 
That being said, only about 10 percent of the population has access to Internet and only about 1 
percent has land-based telephone access (Lancaster, 2016).  Like much of Africa, mobile 
networks are extremely important and in that regard, nearly the entire population has access to a 







there were 170 subscriptions (Figure IIX). Certainly, access to mobile technology has improved 
people’s welfare to some extent.  
3. Oil  
!
 The most important sector of the economy is oil.  Oil production has reached 12.5 million 
tons per year (Global Energy Statistics, 2013).  As previously discussed, the oil industry props up 
the country’s economy, making the government profitable but the economy susceptible to price 
shocks (Global Energy Statistics, 2013). We have outlined past scandals related to the oil 
industry, but understanding the French presence in the country and in the oil industry requires a 
detailed outline of French investment.  Elf Aquitaine had monopoly status in the country for 
several decades, but, as previously discussed, TOTAL absorbed the company following the 
scandal and production went uninterrupted in Gabon (Heilbrunn, 2005).  
 TOTAL owns the rights to Gabon’s largest oil reserves. The majority of these reserves lie 
in the Gulf of Guinea off of the South Eastern coast. It was not until the 1980s when oil 
production ramped up and truly began driving growth.  Though TOTAL runs and operates all of 
their activities in the country, Gabon’s government receives about 25% of annual revenue from 
TOTAL’s 50 stations operating in the country (Arditti, 2015).  TOTAL owns about 45% of 
shares in Société Gabonaise de Raffinage (SOGARA), the country’s domestic refining company 
that operates out of Port Gentille (“World Energy Council: Gabon”, 2011).  
 In 2010, an investigation within Ali Bongos effort to fight corruption found that TOTAL-
Gabon had been evading cooperate taxes between 2008 and 2010. The company was fined $805 







billion annually (Bozec, 2016). Since the fines were levied, TOTAL-Gabon has claimed to adopt 
strict ethics reforms. Of TOTAL’s many operations across the globe, its almost exclusive control 
over production in Gabon is one of their most profitable.  TOTAL’s relationship with the 
government in Gabon has been tumultuous, to say the least, but the presence in the country is 
likely to persist for many years to come and the close relationships between TOTAL executives 
and government officials remain strong (Levine, 2011).  In addition, TOTAL reportedly invested 
approximately $703 million into Gabon’s economy, contributing to the welfare of average 
Gabonese citizens (Global Energy Statistics, 2013).  In 2010 fuel exports accounted for nearly 
90% of the country’s total exports, that same year the government in Libreville collected rents 
equivalent to about 30% of their total GDP. Needless to say, the success of the country’s 
economy is tied to international prices of crude oil (Figure II).  
 Gabon’s government has been a vital partner for TOTAL for decades but the company 
has not enjoyed carte blanche in the country since Omar Bongo’s regime. Italian firm ENI and 
duel British-Dutch firm Shell have been granted rights to an increasing volume of crude reserves 
in the country in recent years (Levine, 2011). Ali Bongo has proven his willingness to embrace 
foreign investment in the highly profitable industry from elsewhere likely in an attempt to 
promote competitiveness between companies, making the central government more profitable in 











Like much of sub-Saharan Africa, consumer credit is tight for Gabonese citizens.  Rapid 
growth brought about by oil excavation attracted interest from some international financiers, but 
most of the capital goes directly to the natural/primary resource sector.  The preeminent banking 
entity in Gabon is Banque Gabonaise et Française Internationale or BGFI (duel French and 
Gabonese institution) which, with Banque Internationale pour le Commerce et l’Industrie du 
Gabon or BICIG control about 70percent of Gabonese finance (Pambou). French corporations 
and investors in part own both companies, and both have corporate offices in Paris (“Accueil – 
BGFIBank, 2016”). BICIG expanded its operations to a number of neighboring francophone 
countries. In Gabon's case, only about 230 of every 1,000 citizens are depositors and Only about 
10% of citizens are borrowers from commercial banks (Figure IV). High capital requirements 
and minimum income regulations limit the average citizen's savings ability further contributing 
to a lack of capital. 
The Gabonese elite generally uses French banks like BNP and Socioté Generale, further 
diverting capital away from the economy.  In 2009, Ali Bongo decided to audit both large 
financial institutions, which led to an investigation into BGFI, which resulted in charges of 
embezzlement (Pambou). Financial ties to French multinational corporations operating in Gabon 
were also exposed for illegal activities and fined. Ali Bongo’s regime did not enact any further 
financial regulation or impose any greater oversight over the finance industry after both 







5. Uranium  
 
 The uranium industry in Gabon is in a slump. Today, the country does not report any 
exports in the sector, despite that fact that AREVA has operated mines in the country for several 
decades. With a presence in the country dating back to 1960, the French energy conglomerate is 
active in influencing mining regulations in the country (“AREVA Gabon”).  The largest and 
longest operating excavation site, Mounana, was abandoned in 2006 following evidence of 
significant environmental destruction and negative health impacts to surrounding communities 
(Hecht, 2009).  Since then, however, four new uranium sites have opened up, none of which are 
currently actively producing uranium ore.  In 2016, six additional uranium-prospecting sites were 
discovered by AREVA (“AREVA Gabon”).  Uranium ore prospected in Gabon is not 
particularly radioactive and contains less fissionable material then ore extracted from sites in 
Niger, making the industry less profitable than other countries (Hecht, 2009). 
 New sites have been identified and rights to those sites are firmly controlled by AREVA. 
Following the revelation of mismanagement of Mounana, the government in Gabon has been 
hesitant to allow the prospecting of ore but has been willing to grant excavation rights to 
AREVA (Hecht, 2009). The region surrounding Mounana still shows elevated radiation and 
locals still suffer from exposure (Hecht, 2009). To this day the investment into reclamation has 
been lackluster.  The lack of government oversight in health and environmental protection is 
likely the reason that production has not resumed yet. Interest in establishing formal regulations 









Gabon and France’s relationship has been controversial. Whether it is a true case of neo-
colonial exploitation is to be determined.  Certainly, in their long history, France has had an 
active role in government policy. The French have played a pivotal role in protecting long-time 
allies in the country like Leon M’ba and Omar Bongo. M’ba was a close ally of the French and 
was happy to allow the French to operate clandestine operations from Libreville.  M’ba allowed 
French firms to continue operating in the country without much oversight.  M’ba was an 
instrumental ally and facilitator for French policy in Africa. During the M’ba regime, few would 
deny that he was not an agent of the French government, noting that his rule preceded the rapid 
growth of the economy. 
 Decades of reckless and illegal behavior of French corporations operating in Gabon is a 
fact, and the true impact of the financial scandals and environmental damage may have been 
more than officially reported given that the investigation against Elf was shut down before it was 
fully resolved.  Ironically, the effects of the Elf scandal rippled through the halls of the French 
National Assembly, but much less so in Libreville. Omar Bongo himself claimed that business 
continued as usual following the trials and convictions of Elf executives (Heilbrunn, 2005).  Still, 
Omar Bongo remained in power, continued to amass wealth and visit Paris freely. Omar Bongo 
was able to exert a significant amount of leverage over his country's former administrators. 
French corporations are vital for Gabon’s economic engine.  With monopoly control over 
utilities and logistics, French corporations wield power over Gabon’s government. Officials in 







companies, specifically in the utility sector, is nearly impossible.  In the telecommunications 
sector, competition exists. The relatively small size of the market, however, means that what 
competition there is, accounts for a fraction of the country’s GDP. French corporations are still 
big players in the sector, but certainly do not completely dominate the country. Alternative 
sources for the telecom investment are possible outside France and Africa. In the finance sector, 
the French maintain dominance. Most capital investment in the country’s economy originates 
from French banking institutions, making the country highly reliant on them. At the same time,  
Gabon’s elite generally parks their assets in French institutions.  This two-way relationship is 
vital for economic growth in the country.   
The largest sectors of Gabon’s economy have strong French presence in them.  TOTAL 
enjoys dominance over oil production and thus is of vital importance to the country’s economic 
output.  For years, TOTAL operated outside the county’s regulatory environment.  Both M’ba 
and Omar Bongo allowed the company to operate freely, taking bribes and granting drilling 
rights without formal processes. Interestingly, once Ali Bongo ascended to power, the 
government tightened its grip on the company, forcing the firm to repay unpaid taxes to the state 
while exposing it to more government oversight (Dabanyort 2014).   Once in power, Ali Bongo 
exercised leverage that neither of his predecessors had, signaling to them that business would be 
conduced differently under his regime. Neither TOTAL nor the French government was in a 
position to punish the new leader (Benquet, 2014). To this day, it appears that appeasing Ali 
Bongo is the policy that governs Franco-Gabonese economic relations. While Ali Bongo is in no 
position to ditch TOTAL altogether, inviting foreign competition may make the French even 







In the uranium industry, new investment by French corporation AREVA has arrived in 
Gabon in recent years, but production has not commenced since the closure of the primary site in 
the country.  AREVA is the only company that has access to any uranium in the country and the 
only with rights to explore new deposits.  When widespread environmental and health 
destruction resulted from poorly maintained uranium mining, it was AREVA and not Gabon’s 
government that halted production. The company was not forced to pay any reclamation costs 
nor did they have to pay any fines (Hecht, 2009). The stagnation in Gabon’s legislature in 
establishing mining regulations for the uranium industry will likely continue in the future.  
So given this information, what have the distributive effects been to Gabon’s economy. 
Unfortunately, unlike Côte d’Ivoire data on income distribution in only available from 2005 but 
that year the highest 20% of incomes owned about 50% of total income and the lowest income 
only about 6% (Table 5). Given the country has a poverty rate of about 30% and a GDP per 
capita over $18,000 we have reasonable suspicion that the economy may be more unequal than 
the World Bank estimates suggest (Figure XII). Fertility and infant mortality rates have been 
steadily declining and the population is still urbanizing quickly and HDI has been trending 
upward for several decades (Table 4). A growing economy, even one that is subject to price 
shocks is still a sign of prosperity. We might conclude that economic growth facilitated by 
foreign actors has benefited most Gabonese in terms of quality of life but many still do not see 
direct benefits of this growth.   
Gabon has been run as an autocracy for the vast majority of its time as an independent 
state. With a family dynasty, allegations of fraudulent elections it is far from embracing the 







with if not explicitly in support of. Freedomhouse found that the country has been trending 
toward slightly more authoritarian rule in recent years, however, the economist concluded that its 
democratic process was improving over the latter part of the same period. The country's polity 
score reports that the country has become more authoritarian since Ali Bongo's ascendance to 
power allowing us to question the country's democratic process as a whole (Figure i.). Given the 
controversy surrounding the recent election, we might have further evidence to support an 
argument to why the country is, in fact, a dynastic autocracy.  Maintaining Gabon's role as an 
influential actor in the region is likely to remain in France's long-term regional political and 
economic interest. Democratic processes often threaten this in the long run. 
Gabon and France's economic relationship is complicated. Unlike many cases of former 
colonizer to former colony relations, Gabon is an exception. The government has been able to 
use leverage against their colonial administrators whether through the exercising of existing law 
or with a threat of American companies entering the market. Libreville has successfully asserted 
authority over foreign banks and oil firms. The government in Libreville is able to use that 
wealth to position itself on a higher negotiating field with the French. The French may not be 
dependent on close economic relations with Gabon, but given the nature of Gabon’s economy, 
alternatives to French companies in the most productive sectors are certainly possible. It is in the 
interest of the French to keep the powerful in Gabon happy. While some refer to their 
relationship as “reverse colonization,” I hesitate to do the same.  In many vital sectors of the 
economy, such as logistics, utilities and finance, Gabon appears to be the dependent partner.  In 
this way,  Gabon and France's economic relations are unique and durable. This case seems to 







exploitation, corruption and authoritarianism, one might conclude that France is a neo-colonial 
power. 
The ways Gabon has wielded some negotiating power should not be understated, 
however. Rule of law has been exercised in Gabon over foreign, domestically operating 
businesses. Access to clean water and electricity have been made possible by foreign economic 





















The central question remains, is France a neo-imperial power in West Africa? Why might 
French attitudes and interests differ between both our cases? Ultimately, is their relationship 
defined by dependency, exploitation and political mischievousness or by greater access to 
technology, global markets and increased political liberty?  
i. H1: Evaluation of Democratic Governance   
 
To address the specific French attitudes towards our cases, one must consider the stark 
differences between them. If we accept that France is a neo-colonial power we are in essence 
assuming that in some way, Paris governs these countries or wields considerable influence over 
those that do. Côte d’Ivoire is a large country with a multi-ethnic population, multiple urban 
centers, and a large diverse economy. Gabon, on the other hand, is a single resource economy 
with a population of less than 2 million (Table 1). Neither country has had experience with 
modern democracy since the French left in the 1960s. Both adopted French as their primary 
language and both model their education, law and administrative functions on France's system. 
Certainly, the French have influenced the structure of government in both cases but whether or 
not that translates into direct influence is still in question.  
History has shown us that in Ivory Coast the French played an active, even aggressive 
role in political affairs. Both military interventions, culminating in the deposition of Laurent 







that these actions prove that France is still an imperial power despite both interventions being 
sanctioned by the UN. In Gabon, the French stepped in to protect, as chief advisor to DeGaulle 
on African policy Jacques Foccart called ‘our man in Africa,’ Leon M’ba from being overthrown 
("The French Connection" 2014). In both cases, the French wielded their relatively powerful 
military might to protect their interests. Gbagbo was embracing an anti-French posture; in Gabon 
the coup plotters were thought to have had backing from American business interests. In both 
cases the French made sure that a Francophile maintained power. Following M’ba’s death, the 
French identified and selected Bongo to be his successor, something they had done when Gabon 
was truly a colony. The French helped draft both country’s founding constitutions.  Boigy, Côte 
d’Ivoire’s first president, was a member of France’s Assembly National, Côte d’Ivoire’s second 
president Bédié, was educated in France just as Gbagbo and both Bongos had been. Ouattara is 
the only president in either of our cases not to have been educated in France; he received his 
education in the US. Likely by coincidence, Ouattara and Ali Bongo are both married to French 
women, both of whom are real estate magnates in their respective countries.  
Unlike Côte d’Ivoire, the president of Gabon has shown some political power in Paris. 
This was certainly the case when Omar Bongo was in power. Ali Bongo successfully charged 
foreign French firms in the country. Perhaps the reason we do not see the same in the leadership 
and authority in Abidjan is because of the frequency of changes in leadership and lack of long-
term stability. Omar Bongo was a political insider for 40 years in Paris, longer than most French 
politicians have in their own country. He and to a greater extent his son, are able to wield 
leverage over Paris by threatening access to oil reserves but they were nonetheless reliant on aid, 







actors to deal with from Paris. The French have had interest in who is in power in the country but 
it doesn’t appear that the same leverage over Paris exists in Abidjan. Côte D’Ivoire sends about 
200 more college students to France for higher education than Gabon with 3,642 enrolling in 
2015 (“OECD dataset”).  
Despite France’s expressed desire for democracy in all of its former domains, the country 
still seems to be content with dynasty and autocracy. Omar Bongo had been a vocal advocate for 
French policy and also was never asked to hold an election or devolve power to the legislature. 
His son, after a highly contested election, which monitors in France claimed was rife with fraud, 
was not asked to hold a re-election and was even congratulated by the president of France 
(Maclean 2016).  As previously alluded to, the French have actively worked to change the 
regime in Côte d’Ivoire following the 2nd Ivorian civil war but also supported Gbagbo in his 
conflict with Guillaume Soro in the first civil war. Both countries have moderate positive 
changes in their levels of democracy according to some metrics (Economist, Freedomhouse), 
their polity scores reported the opposite. Neither country is regarded as being uniquely free or 
democratic.  
It has not always been obvious whether French economic interests have driven political 
actions in either country or whether political interest has preceded economic ones, (there is 
evidence for both). Regardless of which came first, it is certainly true that the French have tried 
to stay active in its former colonies and have seemed to place very little interest on the level of 
democracy in those states.  The relative power and influence wielded by French multinationals 
has led to unaccountability in both cases, particularly in the utility, logistics, oil and telecom. 







corruption or harsh repressive rule, relations have remained warm. It was only when Gbagbo 
explicitly called for the expulsion of the French diaspora when the French supported full regime 
change.   With permanent military deployments in both countries and the lack of an active enemy 
in either, the French have effectively pledged these countries military protection from foreign 
threat but also made their presence obvious, even showing their willingness to depose leaders 
when they see fit or protect those at risk of collapsing. In the context of Dependency Theory, this 
sort of dynamic breeds rent-seeking behavior and might undermine democratic institutions. 
Without accountability, dynastic states like Gabon can engage in corrupt behavior. Conversely, 
the modernist might posit that the close relations have allowed beneficial commercial 
agreements, protection, growth and even more democracy. The justice system in Gabon 
exercised some authority over foreign firms, unlike Côte D'Ivoire. The assertion that these 
arrangements have prioritized democracy can be found wanting. In our cases, it appears that the 
dependency theorist view is supported more than the modernist view.  
ii. H2: Evaluation of Economic Benefits and Growth  
 
 The Singer-Prebisch hypothesis, the bedrock of Dependency Theory, is premised on 
negative balance of trade between developing and developed countries. Hobson discussed 
colonial territories as large markets for domestically produced manufactured goods. Both Côte 
d’Ivoire and Gabon run a negative trade deficit with France. Both are reliant on French made 







Neither country has a manufacturing sector to speak of. For a small country like Gabon, 
that might not be surprising, but for a country the size Côte d’Ivoire to be highly reliant on goods 
manufactured in Europe, is. Attempts to attract investment into manufacturing industries have 
been made in both countries to no avail, but investment into raw resource extraction has been 
consistent (. We do have some evidence to suggest that when France joined the common market 
with Europe, both cases gained both willing export and import partners in Europe. The EU 
signed preferential trade agreements bilaterally with both cases but neither reported any 
significant change in direct investment from any European power other than France. About 42% 
of Côte d’Ivoire’s exports head to Europe and only about 18% of Gabon’s (“Gabon International 
Trade”, 2014), (“Côte d’Ivoire International Trade”, 2014). 
 Rapidly growing economies are a welcome site for service exporters in developed 
economies. The longstanding French presence in Gabon and Côte d’Ivoire has situated financial, 
telecom, logistics and utility companies to make handsome return from raising rates of 
consumption and a widening middle class.  
 In the finance industry, African countries struggle to attract investment. Both Côte 
d’Ivoire’s and Gabon’s industrial and commercial sectors benefit from access to credit. This 
credit does not trickle down. The administrative state in both countries is such that doing proper 
credit checks is difficult, especially considering the size of either country’s informal labor 
market. Households only account for about 3.1% of total credit in Côte d’Ivoire and only about 
5% in Gabon (“Gabon Data Set”,2017), (“Côte d’Ivoire Data Set”, 2017). Domestically owned 
credit only accounts for 30% of Côte d’Ivoire’s total available with the rest coming from foreign 







becoming more widely used in both cases and mobile banking has filled the gap in the lack 
depositing institutions. Foreign credit has been vital for economic growth in developing 
countries. The limitations to domestic banking are likely structural in nature. Local elites 
notoriously park their assets in Western economies. Both Ouattara and Ali Bongo own multiple 
multimillion-dollar estates in Paris, as do all previous leaders of Gabon and Côte d’Ivoire (Yahya 
1994). Modernists would likely point to the benefits of credit access for industrial development, 
dependency theorists would emphasize the inability for the average citizen to receive credit. 
How, and to what extent a government is capable of enacting regulation to make credit 
accessible to a broader proportion of the population is questionable. 
Consistent access to electricity and clean water is vital for any developing country. In our 
cases, as in many other sub-Saharan African countries, power generation and water treatment are 
in the private control of foreign firms. French businesses built the primary power generating 
stations in both Gabon and Côte d’Ivoire. We should take pause and consider the implications of 
a single foreign enterprise controlling vital infrastructure. First, in Côte d’Iviore’s case, the 
country is subject to daily power shortages and blackouts (Wilson 2015).  Because there is a 
shortage of power and one primary power provider, people who can afford to rent seek might do 
so. Second, the central government has reduced negotiating power, whether for prices or 
regulation, with the dominant utility company. With only one seller (small amounts of electricity 
are imported from Ghana to Cd’I) and one buyer, the utility firm can charge the price they wish 
to. This monopoly arrangement appears to be an artifact of the colonial era. Lastly, because the 
utility company has no entity to compete with, they have no incentive to improve or upgrade. 







who is officially a part of the grid and who is stealing from it?  Without a strong administrative 
state, keeping track of individuals is difficult. The Modernist would view such a problem as 
structural requiring closer embrace of the western method of governance; the dependency 
theorist would likely point toward the poor negotiating power as a reason to justify nationalizing 
the sector. Access to clean water and electricity are on the rise in both cases but problems persist 
and the uncomfortable relationship between foreign MNCs and the central government will 
persist.  
The logistics industry is vital for Sub-Saharan countries, particularly those rich in natural 
resources. Bolloré Logistiques is among the largest firms of its type in the world and by far the 
largest in Africa. This mega corporation operates all major ports and railways in both cases. The 
firm has been underbid for infrastructure projects in Gabon and Côte d’Ivoire yet still constantly 
receive the contacts to begin construction (Bolloré Logistics - Bolloré). Needless to say, the 
company holds monopoly status in West Africa. Unfortunately, this market structure breeds rent-
seeking behavior generally at the expense of civilians living without stable infrastructure. 
Certainly, industrial infrastructure does provide some positive externalities to communities 
located near projects, but infrastructure’s primary purpose remains the service raw material 
extraction. Countries in desperate need for roads and railways, could spend less of their annual 
budgets on expensive building contracts with Bolloré and instead redirect funds into other 
sectors of their economies. The dependency theorist would emphasize the previous point with 
Modernists asserting that the relative benefit of having access to global market though export 
infrastructure has benefited the country immensely. That being said, the sector is instrumental in 







 Africa has benefited immensely from the presence of the telecom industry. Both of our 
cases have seen rapid growth in the number of telephone subscriptions and users. The role of 
mobile banking cannot be understated, as it has become the primary banking tool used by tens of 
millions of Africans including millions from both cases. The introduction of large foreign 
telecom companies has crowed out some local providers but simultaneously allowed for cellular 
access large rural areas of Gabon and Côte d’Ivoire.  Regulations have been passed in Côte 
d’Ivoire that allowed French telecom Orange to increase their market share making the country’s 
market a duopoly. This structure allows for some degree of price fixing but also for an economy 
of scale because once cellular infrastructure is in place making upgrades to accept more 
subscribers is relatively cheap. In Gabon, their telecom providers are not French, but there too, 
only a limited number of providers exist. Overall, the industry has been growing rapidly. 
Although there is a noted lack of competition, the effect that millions of people have a cheap, 
reliable method for communicating and banking which in the long run could promote further 
growth and even democratization. In this industry, the Modernist perspective seems to find its 
strongest support. Access to telecommunication technology and investment has had a net 
positive effect on millions of people in Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon.  
Gabon’s uranium industry was never large enough to elicit much international attention 
but reckless care for the environment and health resulted in mining waste polluting ground water 
and soil in the country’s interior. Very few locals were employed in mining operations and of 
those that did, many suffered radiation related health issues (Hecht 2009). Fortunately, 
operations were halted but there is little evidence that any support was given to those 







regulation and plan to open new mining sites, we should not expect net positive welfare effects 
for locals, now or in the future. Dependency theorists might point to this industry as being a 
textbook example of neo-colonial exploitation. To that point they have support but it is necessary 
to keep in mind that operations were halted when the worst abuses were reveled.   
 In the Oil Industry as in the Logistics industry, French West Africa has one primary 
player, TOTAL. The company’s operations in Gabon were wrought with corruption when ELF-
Aquitaine ran offshore extraction. In Côte d’Ivoire, TOTAL received very generous rights to 
extract nearly 100% of its reserves. In Gabon’s case, oil exports were instrumental in driving 
with economy’s growth. Between 2000 and 2014 the Gabon’s GDP swelled from about $5bn to 
over $18bn (Figure XII). It is particularly difficult to follow the flow of oil revenue once the 
good leaves Gabon’s shores. It is unlikely that much of the revenues reach the lowest rungs of 
the socioeconomic scale. Considering 30% of Gabon’s population lives bellow the poverty line 
and with a GDP per capita over $18,000 (Table 1). Inequality is extreme in the West African 
country (Table 5).  Omar Bongo was able to leverage his country's oil wealth to acquire 
influence in Paris. Unfortunately, the oil industry does not create as many jobs for the local 
population as one might expect. Other externalities, like improvements to infrastructure and 
social services, generally lie near oil operations or are only accessible to the local elite or 
expatriates. Moreover, with only one multinational controlling most production, the lack of 
competition makes industry oversight difficult and the risk of coercive behavior. Energy 
resources are notorious for failing to redistribute benefits from its production. An unintended 
effect of increased investment in a single sector takes away potential investment into others, a 







host country is a benefit, we have not seen any clear evidence of positive distributive effects for 
the lower end of the income spectrum from oil extraction given our limitations. Dependency 
theorists often look at energy resources as a strong defense of their development perspective. For 
many of the reasons previously alluded to, dependency theorist’s are likely more justified in their 
criticism of western multinational corporation than Modernists are in their praise. Gabon did 
successfully recover millions in back taxes from TOTAL in 2009 giving us some hope that 
administrative checks on these large corporations are being used (Dabany 2011).  
 The evidence supports hypothesis 2 with some limitations. Both countries have benefited 
greatly from foreign investment. We should consider the crowding out effect of foreign capital 
undercutting domestic entrepreneurship. On that point, dependency theorists are correct but in 
aggregate, both cases have seen economic growth. Côte d’Ivoire’s economy, while real incomes 
have not risen dramatically, has provided millions of jobs to immigrants from neighboring 
countries aiding those countries’ growth. The modernist argument and liberal trade policies 
offered by economists like Sachs and Collier have attracted foreign investment in both cases. 
That investment does not tend to flow into secondary good production due to high starting costs 
and relatively lower marginal return on capital from new industries. This fact articulated in the 
Singer-Prebisch hypothesis seems to also hold up today. Manufacturing has been weak in both 
countries, and luxury goods consumed by the upper classes are imported from developed 
countries. The hope in 2017 is that African countries will be able to develop without a large 







iii. H3: Evaluation of French MNC’s Impacts on Inequality  
 
 In our case’s sectors, we see both positive and negative effects on societal welfare. Côte 
d’Ivoire's cocoa industry employs millions of farmers whom can only sell to a government 
buyer. A kilogram of raw cocoa is sold for about 1,100 CFA, which is about $1.60 (Mieu, Jha 
2016). The industry has attracted migrants from all over West Africa. Today the country is by far 
the largest producer of cocoa in the world. Large chocolate companies are willing to buy any 
stockpile of cocoa. The government run monopsony makes an estimated 44% profit from selling 
to firms like Cargill and Nestle (Mieu, Jha 2016). While exporting large amounts of cocoa has 
grown the economy, the country’s economy has become reliant on the global price for cocoa 
(Hailey, 2014). When poor weather damages a harvest, the entire country’s budget is negatively 
affected. Just as any other commodity, the price cocoa is subject to variability. When other 
African, Asian or South American countries expand their production or have a large yield, the 
global price of cocoa responds to the surplus and the bidding price is reduced. The majority of 
agricultural workers in the sector, particularly in the rural areas in the North of the country, live 
bellow the poverty line (Mieu, Jha 2016). Child labor is still rampant in the industry despite 
some attempts to enforce labor laws for minors. With the largest import markets in Europe and 
the largest chocolate companies hailing from the west, there are necessarily restraints to 
producers selling for market price in the international market.  
 The policy adopted by the government of Côte d’Ivoire would likely be hailed by some 
dependency theorists as being an effective way of preventing foreign exploitation of labor. The 







farmer's product, preferring instead an open competitive market with a large base of producers 
and a larger number of buyer firms. Cocoa farmers only receive a fraction of profit but in this 
case, the majority is earned by the government which, without pervasive corruption will 
redistribute those to government programs. 
The true nature of our cases' labor markets is also difficult to quantify. Unfortunately, 
data related to the amount of labor employed in each sector is unavailable to us. We can make 
some comparisons of our GINI with other comparable countries in similar states of development. 
We find that among African states, either of our cases lies generally with the average African 
GINI, between 40-45 (“World Bank GINI dataset”). These estimates are better than the GNI for 
some South American countries that dwell closer to 50s. In terms of income distribution, 
interestingly, despite the stark differences in the composition of their economies, both have 
relatively similar distributions of income between brackets (Table 4). Most African and South 
American countries have a higher degree of income inequality than developed countries that tend 
to have GINIs around 30-35 (“World Bank dataset”). 
The distributional affects are hard to quantify in full however, there are facts that need to 
be addressed. First, growth in both cases has been rapid in the last few decades French capital 
has been instrumental to that growth. French multinationals receive special status in the utility, 
finance, oil, and logistics. The middle and upper-class urban population has seen improved 
access to well-paying jobs but there is a notable lack of welfare improvement for the lower 
income distribution. Rapid growth has occurred in both countries. A powerful elite exists in both 
cases, a group that tends to have close ties with MNCs particularly those French firms heavily 







cases, but importantly to note, the welfare of the majority of citizens are often left out of 
negotiations. Governments and MNCs both exercise exploitive practices so defining ‘good guys’ 
and ‘bad guys’ is an unnecessary exercise that will reveal little about the true nature of the 
problem. Luxury goods in these economies tend to be imported from abroad. For that reason, 
those goods tend to also be more expensive which prices out most low and middle-income 
people.  
We can confidently make the assertion that French foreign FDI does have some negative 
distributive effects, however, countries of similar level of development have about the same 
income distribution. Although we cannot confidently argue that the dependency theorists are 
completely correct in their assertion that foreign FDI is a direct cause of income inequality, we 
have noted the ways in which FDI can worsen income inequality. Unable to fine definitive 
evidence in support of either the modernist or dependency theorist’s interpretation, hypothesis 3 
















"The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, 
independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality, its 
economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside” (Nkrumah 1966, 
ix).   
 Does Nkrumah’s definition of neo-colonialism apply to our cases? If we apply his 
definition at its face value, the degree to which policy in Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon are “directed” 
by France is not without limitations. Today the world is a different place than it was over 50 
years ago when Nkrumah first discussed neo-colonialism. Neo-colonialism resembling what 
Nkrumah described does not manifest in Gabon or Côte d’Ivoire. We can confidently argue that 
the French do influence domestic economic policy in both of our cases. The complete distrust of 
foreign economic influence may be slightly misguided. 
Having concluded that (1), former French colonies are tied to Paris in intimate ways, 
through personal and commercial ties, facilitating direct and indirect influence on the country's 
economy. (2) We have found that there are notable positive externalities associated with large 
amounts of foreign investment into developing economies, especially in the telecoms, utilities, 
and logistics, which is not to suggest that aspects of those sectors do not in some ways exploit or 
limit local capital formation or labor standards. (3) We have looked critically at natural and 
agricultural resource sectors noting their distributive effects on the economy and their history of 







correct in some of their assessments. We were able to support H1 in both of our cases. Both have 
had decades of French multinational presence and neither has seen dramatic positive changes in 
levels of democracy, apparently supporting this premise of dependency theory. Imbalances in 
negotiating power and lack of government accountability due to power and influence of French 
corporations has allowed autocrats to remain in power.  I do not mean to suggest that the French 
do not value democracy, what I assert is that economic interests trump calls for a democratic 
process. This is evidence in support of the dependency theorist ideas on economic development. 
Gabon has exercised more authority over foreign companies than Côte d’Ivoire has but 
nonetheless, neither country is free to act without the attention of Paris.  
Ample evidence was provided to support H2. Both cases have seen fast GDP growth and 
attracted FDI. The orthodox modernist idea that democratic institutions precede economic 
development is unfounded in either case, but economic growth does not necessarily mean a 
stable or democratic political atmosphere. Access to large export markets has perhaps been the 
most important driver for growth but still, these countries have a trade deficit with the French 
and are mostly unsuccessful at attracting investment into manufacturing or heavy industry. 
French firms are often favored over other foreign firms adding unnecessary additional costs to 
the annual budget. Foreign capital also has a crowding out effect on domestic industries. Capital, 
even domestically owned, tends to flow where foreign capital does. Secondary goods find it 
difficult to attract foreign capital so neither country has been able to grow the sector in dramatic 
ways. Because industrialization was the path all modern industrialized countries took to 
development, this fact has future implications. Ultimately this hypothesis was confirmed with 







has benefited the economy, the dependency theorists are correct in arguing the negative 
externalities of investment.  
H3 was not fully supported by the evidence available. Perhaps the more dramatic 
inequality claims are due to the relatively frequent cases of corruption at the highest levels of 
governments. That said, both countries still have serious income inequality and poverty is to this 
day endemic. In Côte d’Ivoire we do see downward pressure on domestic labor in the cocoa 
industry however, the government is able to act as an intermediary and earn revenue on cocoa 
production. There are certainly ways inequality is worsened with FDI but to the extent that it 
makes the country better or worse off is a conclusion we cannot make. Without definitive data 
hypothesis 3, despite some incomplete data and anecdotal evidence, we are unable to make a 
conclusion in support of or against one theory or the other.  
This investigation has several important policy implications. For the leadership of Gabon 
and Côte d’Ivoire, policies that promote the investment of foreign capital and those that 
maximize the amount of revenue collected by the state should be preferred. Limiting 
opportunities for government officials to interact directly with foreign commercial actors would 
be a worthwhile step to provide accountability for our case’s governments. To lessen income 
inequality, comprehensive census and formal addressing are necessary steps to maximize tax 
revenue. Attracting investment into secondary goods is a more difficult endeavor. Incentives for 
locals and foreigners should be provided for investors. Working diligently to address corruption 
will be a further necessary step. For French leadership, a continuation of this policy is the best 
method for sustained presence in either country. The French might continue to manage troop 







exports then they should make more investments into secondary industries in order to widen the 
middle class. While it is not in France’s interest to maximize welfare in their partner country, 
access to export markets is useful for French commerce. For an American leader, the policy 
implication is that more investment should be sent to African countries. If America is interested 
in expanding its sphere of influence, Africa is a continent where political influence is relatively 
cheap and returns on capital investment into primary products are high. A more engaged 
American economic, political and trade policy toward African countries will promote American 
interests but may in the long-run have similar effects to what we see with French multinational 
presence in sub-Saharan Africa.  
We should address the limitations of this investigation. Perhaps the most effective 
information relevant to this study is the personal relationship between the local government 
officials and French political actors. Secondly, data on income distribution in both cases should 
be viewed with some pause. Countries with large informal sectors, child labor and incomplete 
census data make accurately gauging income groups and their distribution difficult. We cannot 
confidently attribute all inequality to foreign multinationals, the character of the economy might 
be such that inequalities are a part of the economy and are necessary for long-run growth. We 
cannot make conclusions about the interests of specific government officials, especially when 
negotiations and meetings happen outside the view of media sources.  We have yet to see how 
widespread access to mobile technology has effected overall economic development, hopefully, 
further studies will approach this question.   
We have no reason to think the bilateral relations between our cases and France will 







with vital foreign capital largely originating from France, the governments are unlikely to 
become more exclusionary of foreign capital. French military presence in both countries has only 
grown in recent years and no presidential candidate seems to have a policy that deviates from the 
status quo. Perhaps as China becomes more influential to the extent that parts of Africa fall 
bellow their sphere of influence, we may see some friction between French interests on the 
continent. Though we have seen marginal improvements to the level of democracy in both 
countries, we have no reason to expect either country is immune to future authoritarian rule and 
as such we have no reason to expect the French to impose such a system on them.  
Following this investigation, empirical investigations into specifically how FDI and 
economic development correlate would be the next step to better grasp to true costs and benefits. 
Further investigations into trade relations might also be fitting. Uncovering other relevant foreign 
economic actors present in both countries could reveal conclusions that might find another 
country also being uniquely influential. Perhaps the most useful further study would reveal a 
more about how income is distributed in these countries, an endeavor that would require a major 
commitment to surveying and aggregating. Fortunately, the special relationship that began in the 
late 1800s has changed over the decades as another replaces one leader, resources are discovered 
and economic crises occur. But, nonetheless, the core relationship stands and Gabon and Côte 
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i. Tables  
Table 1 
General Info #1 
 
Table 2 





































Gabon 14.262 3.2% 1.92% 267,667 French 32.7% 35.7%6 3.74/10 5.5/10 45.88/100 19,300 1,725,292 
Ivory 
Coast 
87.12 8% 1.88% 322,463 French 42% 5.3%7 3.81/10 5.5/10 52.31/100 3,600 23,740,424 
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Case Gabon Côte d’Ivoire 
Year HDI1 Freedom2 Democracy 
Index 
HDI1 Freedom2 Democracy Index 
1980 0.548   0.376   
1985 0.596   0.382   
1990 0.620   0.389   
1995 0.633   0.390   
2000 0.632 4.5  0.398 5.5  
2005 0.644 4.5 2.27 0.415 6.0 3.38 
2010 0.663 5.5 3.29 0.444 5.5 3.02 
2015 0.684 5.5 3.76 0.462 4.5 3.31 
 
Table 511 
 Inequality Statistics 
Gabon 
Year 2005 
Highest 10% 33.15 
Highest 20% 48.68 
Second 20% 10.06 
Third 20% 14.37 
Fourth 20% 21.08 
Lowest 20% 5.82 
Lowest 10% 2.27 
Poverty ratio at national poverty lines (% of population) 32.7 
GINI index 42.18 
  Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Côte 
d’Ivoire 
FDI Possitions 396.6  409.0  534.2  656.5  449.5  480.7  939.2  885.1  1,152.6  1,171.8  1,062.2  1,410.3  
Net FDI Inflow  102.1  -19.8  14.7  54.7  -1.2  72.8  60.2  73.1  113.9  91.4  -11.1  117.0  
Gabon FDI Possitions 305.8  1,026
.7  
1,782.1  2,163.0  2,219.0  2,638.0  2,855.9  1,482.2  1,943.5  1,934.8  1,730.6  1,779.7  
Net FDI Inflow 104.8  46.2  -32.8  42.2  138.0  158.2  275.2  381.6  54.2  -7.9  26.5  206.9  
  Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Côte 
d’Ivoire 
FDI Possitions 293.4  309.8  334.0  263.3  238.1  155.8  306.6  380.8  394.3  472.6  476.2  509.9  
Net FDI Inflow  1.1  11.9  19.1  10.2  -4.2  1.8  10.8  29.1  171.5  .. .. .. 
Gabon FDI Possitions 195.6  750.6  850.0  681.4  724.3  628.2  870.2  943.1  912.5  931.1  998.6  1,202.2  
Net FDI Inflow 125.6  123.2  132.6  95.8  187.6  176.9  233.0  246.1  68.5  .. .. .. 











Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1992 1995 1998 2002 2008 2015 
Highest 10% 35.61 29.53 32.03 28.33 29.52 32.78 30.08 32.71 32.64  
Highest 20% 51.29 45.44 47.57 43.91 45.82 47.56 46.2 48.49 49.01  
Second 20% 9.33 10.88 10.38 11.32 10.55 10.17 10.83 10.58 9.83  
Third 20% 13.78 15.15 14.79 15.47 15.33 14.54 15.19 14.26 14.32  
Fourth 20% 20.65 21.63 20.97 22.48 22.33 21.14 21.43 20.6 21.72  
Lowest 20% 4.95 6.89 6.28 6.81 5.98 6.58 6.35 6.06 5.11  
Lowest 10% 1.79 2.81 2.45 2.69 2.28 2.71 2.56 2.3 1.84  
GINI index 45.53 37.97 40.51 36.89 39.39 40.56 38.96 41.34 43.18  
Poverty ratio at national poverty lines (% of population) 38.4 48.9 46.3 
 Term  Rise to power Elections (% of 
popular vote) 
Political Party Education Ties to France 
Gabon 
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ii. Figures  
Figure I11 














































































































































































































































Figure VI 11 






























































































































































































































































































Improved Water access 
 
iii. Key Development Indicators 
!
Figure XII11 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Real GDP (pegged 2010) 
 











































































v. Summary of Conclusions 
!
  Ivory Coast Gabon 
Hypothesis 1: 
Evaluation of Democratic 
Governance  
Supported  Supported 
Hypothesis 2: 
Evaluation of Economic 
Benefits and Growth 
Supported with some 
limitations 
 Supported with many 
limitations 
Hypothesis 3: 
Evaluation of French MNC’s 
Impacts on Inequality 
Inconclusive (unable to prove 
causation, lack of data), some 
evidence in support, some 
evidence to the contrary  
 Inconclusive (lack of data) 
Some evidence in support, 










vi. Table and Figure Sources 
 
1.  http://hdr.undp.org/en/data
2. https://freedomhouse.org                                
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/e
















11. World Bank Datase 
http://data.worldbank.org/ 
12. Polity IV Project 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity
/polity4.htm 
13. OECD dataset https://data.oecd.org/ 
 
  
